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. Introduction
"[T]here is no other phase of American jurisprudence with so many
refinements and subtleties, as relate to removal proceedings, [that] is known by
all who have to deal with them."' Removal jurisdiction is by its nature a
peculiar creation;2 it has no predecessor in English common law and is not
mentioned in the Constitution, yet it has been an important component of
federal court jurisdiction since its creation in the Judiciary Act of 1789.3 In
fact, in 2006, approximately 11% of all cases pending in federal court were
removed cases. 4
Since 1789, one of the more troublesome refinements presented by the
statute has tasked federal courts with determining whether a civil action
brought originally in a state agency complies with the removal requirement that
a civil action be brought originally in a state court.5 Beginning in the late
nineteenth century, federal courts began to encounter this interpretative
problem as states began using commissions and primitive agency-like tribunals
to fulfill a number of state regulatory functions, including ratemaking, property
appraisal, and condemnation proceedings.6
Savvy defendants, often
corporations, attempted to use the statute to remove actions filed in these state
bodies to federal court.7 During this period, the Supreme Court of the United
1.

Hagerla v. Miss. River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912).
See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ErAL., MOORE'S FEDERALPRACTICE § 107.03 (3d ed. 2008)
("Removal is a peculiar procedure in that it permits defendants to remove an action properly
brought in one system of courts, our state courts, into another set of courts, our federal district
courts.").
3. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (3d ed. 1998) ("There was no procedure comparable to
removal at English common law, nor is removal jurisdiction mentioned in the Constitution.").
4. MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 107.23.
5. See infra note 17 for the text of the Judiciary Act of 1789 providing for removal.
6. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 107App. 101 (3)-(4) (discussing early Supreme
Court cases addressing removal from administrative or other nonjudicial tribunals).
7. Id.
2.
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States authored numerous opinions attempting to solve the removal problems
presented by proceedings in these tribunals, but never authoritatively provided
a standard delineating the requirements for a "state court."8
Exacerbating the issue, in the twentieth century, states increasingly began
to create agencies to regulate and to legislate in many more areas of substantive
law, presenting more opportunities for the federal removal statute to clash with
proceedings brought in state agencies. 9 In 1959, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin fashioned a new test, one that
focused on whether the state agency "functioned" as a court in adjudicating a
particular proceeding.10 The district court, and subsequent courts that have
adopted its reasoning, argued that an 1890 Supreme Court case, Upshur County
v. Rich," endorsed such a standard.' 2 Almost seven years later, a different
district court disagreed, citing the plain language of the phrase "state court,"
thus commencing a split in the lower federal courts that continues to this day. 3
As state agencies continue to occupy a significant, and continually
increasing, role in states' legislative and executive regulatory systems, the
opportunity for the federal interests in removal to collide with state interests
continues to escalate, producing a judicial headache for federal judges
attempting to resolve the problem. 14 While judges faced with the problem can
resort to the use of the factually intensive functional test, this Note argues that
federal courts should interpret "state court" according to its plain language,
which, generally, does not apply to state agency proceedings.

8. Id.
9.

By 1965, a conservative estimate placed the number of state agencies at over 2,000.
(1965).
10. See Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gen. Elec. Co. XRay Dep't, 170 F. Supp. 945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (holding proper removal of a proceeding
before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board because it "meets the test of a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of the Federal Judicial Code").
11. See Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 477 (1890) (holding appeal of property
appraisal in Upshur county court did not constitute a "suit at law" because the appeal was not an
action interpartes and the county court had no judicial powers, thus making removal improper).
12. Infra note 49 and accompanying text.
13. See Cal. Packing Corp. v. I.L.W.U. Local 142, 253 F. Supp. 597, 598-99 (D. Haw.
1966) (holding that the removal of action from Hawaii Employment Relations Board was
improper).
14. The issue was addressed by two separate courts in 2008. See Johnson v. Albertson's
LLC, No. 3:08cv236/MCR/MD, 2008 WL 3286988, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6,2008) (addressing
the split in the lower federal courts over the use of the functional test); Civil Rights Div. v.
Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No. 08-60493-CIV, 2008 WL 2616154, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 15,
2008) (rejecting the "functional test" as going "beyond the language of[§] 1441, which does not
authorize removal of proceedings from administrative agencies").
FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2
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The discussion below proceeds as follows: Part II briefly chronicles the
development of the removal statute from 1789 to the Supreme Court's 1890
opinion in Upshur County. In order to evaluate the reasoning of courts
adopting the functional test, Part III analyzes the facts and principles of Upshur
County. Parts IV and V present the arguments in favor of and against the use
of the functional test. Part VI argues that Upshur County did not endorse a
functional test, but did provide insight into the qualifications an agency must
exhibit to be a "court." Finally, Part VH reevaluates the functional test,
focusing on statutory interpretative doctrines and policy implications that the
functional test inflicts on both states' and plaintiffs' interests in the
uninterrupted utilization of state agency proceedings. Reevaluating the
functional test leads to the conclusion that courts must stop utilizing the test to
determine the viability of removal from state agencies. Instead, courts must
adhere to the plain language of the removal statute, which this Note argues
should require a determination of whether a state constitution has vested
judicial power in the specific agency. However, in order to account for the
substantial federal interest in removal for state claims completely preempted by
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 15 this Note
argues that Congress must amend the LMRA to allow for removal of these
actions. Such an amendment is the key linchpin in the careful balancing act of
state, federal, and litigant interests.
H. The Early History of the Removal Statute
Generally, there are two ways of removing a case from a state to a federal
court: first, by Supreme Court review after the state court action has become
final; and second, by transfer from a state court to a federal district court for
original adjudication. 16 The Judiciary Act of 1789 created this latter path to
removal, but premised it upon the satisfaction of certain requirements.17 The
15. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006)).
16. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1767 (3d ed. 1988).
17. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80. The statute states:
That if a suit be commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of
the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and the
matter in dispute exceeds... five hundred dollars,... the defendant shall.., file a
petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit court, to be held
in the district where the suit is pending .... And if in any action commenced in a
state court, the title of land be concerned, and the parties are citizens of the same
state, and the matter in dispute exceeds... five hundred dollars.... the party
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act granted removal to cases "commenced in any state court" with more than
$500 in dispute to three types of parties: (1) a defendant who was an alien;
(2) a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another
state; and (3) either party, where title to land was in dispute under conflicting
grants of land of different states and the non-removing party claimed it under a
grant of the forum state. 18
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not grant removal to those cases arising
under the laws of the United States-what we know today as federal question
removal. 19 Instead, Congress contented itself between 1789 and 1875 to
provide for a series of "relatively specific removal statutes... designed to give
added protection to federal officers or federal law., 20 Almost a century later, in
the Judiciary Act of 1875,21 Congress enormously expanded the federal courts'
removal and original jurisdiction. 22 While the Act allowed removal of an action
by either party and provided for federal question removal, it still required that
the original "suit of a civil nature" be "pending or hereafter brought in any State
court."23 The Supreme Court broadly construed the new removal statute's

grant of federal question removal,24 leading to the "classes of removable cases
cover[ing] substantially the entire gamut authorized by Article In. ,25
claiming under the grant first mentioned may then, on motion, remove the cause for
trial
....
Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. See Michael G.Collins, The UnhappyHistoryofFederalQuestionRemoval, 71 IowA
L. REV. 717, 720 (1986) (noting that "[e]xcept for the short-lived Judiciary Act of 1801,
Congress did not vest general federal question jurisdiction in the lower federal courts until
1875"). Collins attributed this change in removal to its part in the larger substantive law and
"jurisdictional revolution" that was an outgrowth of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Id.
20. Id. The current federal officer removal statute is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2006).
21. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71.
22. See Collins, supra note 19, at 722 (explaining that "[1]ower federal court jurisdiction
probably reached its high-water mark when Congress passed the 1875 Judiciary Act").
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2,18 Stat. 470,470-71 (emphasis added). The statute
provides:
That any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought
in any State court where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or treaties.., or in which there shall be a controversy between
citizens of different States .... either party may remove said suit into the circuit
court of the United States for the proper district.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. See Collins, supra note 19, at 724-30 (discussing the Supreme Court's expansive
interpretation of the removal statute enacted in 1875).
25.

BATOR ET AL., supra note 16, at 1767.
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The current removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441,26 is based on the
Judiciary Act of 1887, which amended the Judiciary Act of 1875.27 The
Judiciary Act of 1887 substantially curtailed removal in response to the
swelling of federal court dockets, at both the trial and appellate levels,
following the Judiciary Act of 1875.28 For one thing, Congress restricted the
privilege of removal to defendants only, citing to the fact that plaintiffs
should have to abide by their choice of forum. 29 The removal provision also
explicitly referenced the preceding provision granting original jurisdiction to
federal courts, thus for the first time stating the well-known modem
requirement that a federal court must have original jurisdiction of a removed
30
action. Citing to this requirement, the Supreme Court further restricted the
defendant's right of removal in federal question cases only to those cases
which the plaintiff could have filed originally in federal court, a precursor to

26. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(a)-(b) (2006) (providing removal based upon diversity between
parties or upon the presence of a federal question). The statute's full text states:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant ....
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
parties ....
Id. (emphasis added).
27. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553. The statute provides:
That any suit of a civil nature,. .. arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States,... of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original
jurisdiction by the preceding section, which may now be pending ... in any State
court, may be removed by the defendant... ; and when in any suit mentioned in
this section there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of
different States, .. .then either one or more of the defendants... may remove said
suit into the circuit court of the United States for the proper district.
Id. (emphasis added). The statute was amended by Act ofAug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1,25 Stat.
433,433-36.
28. See Collins, supra note 19, at 738-42 (chronicling the legislative history of the
Judicial Act of 1887). Interestingly, there were "at least a halfa dozen proposals to amend the
1875 Act within a short time after its passage." Id. at 738 n. 109. It is believed that the swelling
of courts' dockets post-Reconstruction was due in large part to the increased removal of
diversity cases as a result of a boom in interstate commercial activity, although federal question
cases can be blamed as well for part of the burden. Id. at 744.
29. See id. at 743 (observing that "a consistent string of House Reports suggests that the
purpose of the 1887 amendments of the 1875 Act's removal provision was simply to eliminate
the possibility of plaintiff removal" because it was thought proper to require the plaintiff to
abide by his selection of a forum).
30. BATORETAL.,supra note 16, at 1768.
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the well-pleaded complaint rule.31 In a later decision, the Supreme Court,
reflecting upon the successive changes to the removal statute wrought by the
Judiciary Acts of 1875 and 1887, stated: "[T]he language of the Act of 1887
evidence[s] the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal
courts on removal," and "the policy of the successive acts of Congress
regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict
construction of such legislation."32 Thus, by the time the Supreme Court
decided Upshur County a mere three years after passage of the Judiciary Act of
1887, it must have been aware of Congress's intent to restrict the availability of
removal, not to expand it to litigants in proceedings before state boards or
commissions.
III. Supreme Court Precedent?
The dispute in Upshur County v. Rich focused on the 1883 appraisal of
the owners' land in Upshur County, West Virginia.33 Finding the appraisal to
be prohibitively high, the owners concurrently filed a petition of appeal in the
county court of Upshur County protesting the valuation and a petition for
removal of the appeal from the county court to the Federal Circuit Court for the
District of West Virginia.34 The circuit court exercised jurisdiction over the
case, denied appellants' motion to remand, and eventually issued a decree
reducing both the quantity and value per acre of land.35 Upshur County
appealed the decree to the Supreme Court, arguing that the original petition of
appeal filed in the county court was not removable to the federal circuit court
because the appeal was not a suit at law within the meaning of the removal
statute.36
The Supreme Court agreed.37 After explaining that most states allow
taxpayers to appeal property assessments to a tribunal whose purpose is to hear
such appeals--often called a board of commissioners-the Court observed:
31. See Collins, supra note 19, at 718 ("Linking defendant removal to the well-pleaded
complaint rule began with an early Supreme Court construction of the 1887 ancestor of the
modem removal statute in Tennessee v. Union & Planters Bank.").
32. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941).
33. Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 467-68 (1890).
34. Id. at 468. The removal petition stated that the defendants were citizens of
Pennsylvania, that West Virginia and Upshur County were indispensible parties to the case, and
that prejudice and local influence would prohibit their obtaining justice in the state court. Id.
35. Id. at 468-69.
36. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at471.,
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But whatever called, it is not usually a court, nor is the proceeding a suit
between parties; it is a matter of administration, and the duties of the
tribunal are administrative, and not judicial in the ordinary sense of that
term, though often involving the exercise of quasi
judicial functions. Such
38
appeals are not embraced in the removal act.

In making this statement, the Court focused on the nonexistence of the West
Virginia county courts' judicial powers, except in matters of probate, which had
been stripped by an amendment to the West Virginia Constitution. 39 The West
Virginia legislature, however, had granted property owners the right to appeal
property appraisals to the county courts under the West Virginia Constitution's
provision that the county courts "may exercise such other powers and perform
such other duties, not of ajudicialnature,as may be prescribed by law., 40
Thus, according to the Court, both the original property appraisal and the
appeal were assessments or administrative acts, and not suits at law.41 Of
course, there were certain circumstances-an action "against the collecting
officer,.., a bill for injunction, [a petition for] certiorari,and.. . other modes
of proceeding"-when "suits" could arise challenging the legality of taxes and
assessments, which then may become a "suit," and thus removable.
The
ordinary acts of appraisers and property appeal boards, however, "belong to a
different class of governmental functions, executive and administrative in their
43
character, and not appertaining to the judicial department.,
The Court then distinguished the facts of the present case from those of its
previous cases in which it also had been tasked with determining whether an
appeal to a board of commissioners constituted a suit at law. In its previous
cases, the Court appeared to focus on two requirements for a suit to arise:
(1) the tribunal must be vested with judicial powers; and (2) the action must be
interpartes.44 The Court summarized the cases' principles as follows:
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. The amendment, adopted in 1880, replaced Article Eight of West Virginia's 1872
Constitution. The actual powers granted to the county courts included: "jurisdiction in all
matters of probate," "appointment and qualification of personal representatives, guardians,
committees, curators, and the settlement oftheir accounts," "superintendence and administration
of the internal police and fiscal affairs of their counties," "judge of the election, qualification,
and returns of their own members, and of all county and district officers." Id. at 471-72.
40. id. at 472 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 473.
43. Id. at 474.
44. See id. at 476 (explaining that a claim against a county heard before county
commissioners, though the proceedings were in some respects similar to a court, was not in the
nature of a trial interpartes,and thus was not removable until an appeal was taken to the circuit
court for the county (citing Bd. of Comm'rs of Del. County v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133
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[A] proceeding, not in a court of justice, but carried on by executive
officers in the exercise of their proper functions, as in the valuation of
property for the just distribution of taxes or assessments, is purely
administrative in its character, and cannot, in any just sense, be called a
suit; and that an appeal in such a case, to a board of assessors or
commissioners having nojudicialpowers,and only authorized to determine
questions of quantity, proportion and value, is not a suit; but that such an
appeal may become a suit, if made to a court or tribunal having power to
determine questions of law and fact,... and there are parties litigant to
contest the case on the one side and the other.45
In applying this principle to the facts, the Court easily concluded that the
county court was not a judicial body or "court," but was "charged with the
management of [Upshur County's] financial and executive affairs." 46 The
county court was no different than an appraiser, and thus, the owners' appeal
before it was not removable because it was not a "suit" at law.47 Ultimately, the
language used by the Supreme Court to draw a comparison between the county
court and courts vested with judicial power becomes problematic for later
federal courts attempting to resolve whether the term "state court" in the
removal statute includes a state agency. Clearly, Upshur County at least stands
for the principle that the title a state bestows upon a tribunal is not dispositive
of whether the tribunal is actually a "court," but that does not necessarily imply
that the Court also provided a standard by which to evaluate whether an agency
is the functional equivalent of a "court."

IV Courts Adopting the FunctionalTest
A. Tool & Die Makers Lodge Sets the Standard
Subsequent courts to consider removal from state agencies mark the
decision in Tool & Die Makers Lodge v. General Electric Co. X-Ray
Department48 as the first time a lower federal court interpreted Upshur County
U.S. 473,486-87 (1890))); id. at 475 (stating that the general rule is "that the initial proceeding
of appraisement by commissioners is an administrative proceeding, and not a suit; but that if an

appeal is taken to a court, and a litigation is there instituted between parties, then it becomes a
suit").
45. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gen. Elec. Co. XRay Dep't, 170 F. Supp. 945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (holding proper removal of a proceeding

before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (WERB) because the WERB "meets the test
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as endorsing a functional test.49 The Tool & Die Makers court was concerned
with whether, under the rationale of Textile Workers Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills,50 removal of complaints filed with the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board (WERB) would be defeated because the WERB was not a
"state court" within the meaning ofthe removal statute. 5' The dispute involved
the alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and both the
WERB and the State of Wisconsin retained concurrent jurisdiction over CBA
claims. 52 After the WERB scheduled hearings, the employer filed a petition for
removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. ' The district court denied remand. 4
The district court's analysis stressed two things: the Supreme Court's
language in Upshur County and the implications of Lincoln Mills on CBA
disputes filed in the WERB 5 Citing only to Upshur County and Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co.,56 the court stated:
of ajudicial proceeding within the meaning of the Federal Judicial Code").
49. See Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The
genesis of the 'functionalist test' for purposes of removal appears to have been the decision in
Tool & Die Makers Lodge.... ."); Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454
F.2d 38, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1972) (noting that the Tool & Die Makers court "recognized that the
Supreme Court 'has adopted a functional rather than literal test' in the interpretation of the
removal statute"); Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 128 F. Supp. 2d
975, 979 n.3 (S.D. Miss. 2000) ("The origin of the 'functional test' is traced to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Upshur County v. Rich ....
").
50. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)
(holding that federal law is the substantive law to apply in suits brought under Section 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)). Section 301(a) states:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce... may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006)). The Supreme Court concluded that Section 301(a)
conferred jurisdiction upon federal district courts to resolve disputes concerning collective
bargaining agreements (CBA) and expressed that federal courts should fashion remedies for
breaches of CBAs from federal labor policy. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
51. Tool & Die Makers Lodge, 170 F. Supp. at 948.
52. Id.at 950; see also Note, Removal to Federal Courts from State Administrative
Agencies, 69 YALE L.J. 615, 617-18 (1960) (discussing status and powers of the WERB).
53. Tool & Die Makers Lodge, 170 F. Supp. at 947.
54. Id.at 951.
55. See id. at 950, 951 (noting that "it is clear that the Supreme Court of the United States
has adopted a functional rather than a literal test" and explaining that the court's "understanding
of the Lincoln Mills case [is] that State courts... must apply the Federal substantive law
governing collective bargaining rights").
56. See Prentis v. At. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210,226 (1908) (concluding that railroad
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In the construction of Federal statutes dealing with proceedings in State
courts, it is clear that the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates has adopted
a functional rather than literal test. Thus the question of whether a
proceeding may be regarded as an action in a State court within the
meaning of the statute is determined by reference to the procedures and
functions of the State tribunal rather than the name by which the tribunal is
designated.57

Pronouncing this to be the Supreme Court's standard, the district court
concluded that the WERB qualified as a "judicial proceeding" under the
functional test, regardless of two facts: (1) the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's
previous holding that the WERB does not exercise judicial functions when it
resolves CBA disputes; and (2) the WERB did not have the power to enforce
its own orders.58 The court observed that while an inability to enforce orders is
often a dispositive factor weighing against characterizing a state agency as a
"court," it still would decline to accord either fact weight because of the
overwhelming policy implications of allowing a litigant's right of access to a
federal forum to be defeated by a state that has "divided the judicial function
between a Board which hears the evidence and
declares the facts and the law,
59
rulings.
its
enforces
which
court
State
a
and
According to the court, Congress intended for uniform application of the
removal statute throughout the country, without interference from a statecreated special remedy providing an alternative to a traditional court action. 60
Seriously calling into question this statement by the district court, however, is
the Supreme Court's later observation that it has never been contended
seriously that Congress intended federal question removal "be utilized to
foreclose completely remedies otherwise available in the state courts," nor
ratemaking proceedings before the Virginia State Corporation Commission were legislative in
nature and therefore not proceedings in a "state court" entitled to res judicata effect).
57. Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray
Dep't, 170 F. Supp. 945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (emphasis added).
58. Id. An agency's inability to accord equivalent relief found in its state court
counterpart has led some circuits to hold that the agency will never be considered a "court" for
removal purposes. See Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars, USA, 26 F.3d, 1259, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting that it has held previously that an administrative agency unable to accord equivalent
relief as that found in a state court will never be considered a "court").
59. Tool & Die Makers Lodge, 170 F. Supp. at 950. The district court also observed that
the unfair labor practice charges were breach of contract disputes, which could have been
brought in Wisconsin state trial courts without any question as to the propriety of removal. Id.
60. Id.at 951; see also Harrison v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R. Co., 232 U.S. 318, 328 (1914)
(observing "that the judicial power of the United States as created by the Constitution... is a
power wholly independent of state action, and which therefore the several states may not by any
exertion of authority in any form, directly or indirectly, destroy, abridge, limit or render
inefficacious").
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"effect a wholesale dislocation in the allocation ofjudicial business between the
state and federal courts."'61 The district court, however, felt reassured in the
correctness of its holding because Lincoln Mills directed
that state courts must
62
apply federal substantive law in interpreting CBAs.
One of the instant criticisms of the district court's analysis was its failure
to account for the State of Wisconsin's reasons for its "peculiar... partial[]
jettisoning [of] traditional notions of the judicial process through the
establishment of an administrative agency., 63 Subsequent courts, however,
have indicated that the inquiry should focus not only on whether the board or
tribunal "functions" as a court but also on the nature of the respective state and
federal interests in the particular proceeding. 64 Ultimately, Tool & Die Makers
placed a defendant's right to a federal forum over and above the State of
Wisconsin's interests in creating a state agency, and in so doing, provided a
standard for future courts that undervalued legitimate state interests in
delegating power to state agencies and overvalued the federal interest in
providing access to a federal forum.
B. The First CircuitAdopts the FunctionalTest
In Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations
Board,65 the First Circuit undertook to "plot the intersection" of Section 301 (a)
with the federal removal statute.66 Interestingly, the question of removal was
61. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,398 U.S. 235,246,247 (1970).
62. Tool & Die Makers Lodge, 170 F. Supp. at 951.
63. Removal to FederalCourtsfrom State AdministrativeAgencies, supra note 52, at 619.
64. See Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(explaining that it is "necessary to evaluate the functions, powers, and procedures of the state
tribunal and consider those factors along with the respective state and federal interests"); see
also Removal to FederalCourtsfrom State Administrative Agencies, supra note 52, at 626
(arguing that the right to remove a proceeding from an agency should depend upon the
importance of the "advantages contemplated by the state in establishing [an] agency" and in
"restricting review of its orders").
65. Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38,41 (lst Cir. 1972)
(holding proper removal of action from territory-created tribunal under functional test).
66. Id. at 40. Originally, the Asociacion Insular de Guardianes de Puerto Rico, the union
representing Volkswagen's security guards, filed a complaint with the Puerto Rico Labor
Relations Board (PRLRB), claiming that Volkswagen breached the CBA between the two
parties. Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 331 F. Supp. 1043, 1044-45
(D.P.R. 1970). The Board then issued a complaint alleging that Volkswagen's actions violated
Puerto Rico's unfair labor practice statute. Id. at 1045. Volkswagen filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, asking for a declaratory judgment that
Section 301(a) deprived the PRLRB of jurisdiction over its issued complaint because such
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not presented directly to the court; instead, the court was to determine whether
the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board (PRLRB) had jurisdiction over the
67
complaint issued by it in response to a charge of unfair labor practices.
Previously, StarPublishingCorp. v. PuertoRico NewspaperGuild,68 a district
court opinion, held that the PRLRB was an "administrativeagency that
lack[ed] the power to enforce its own orders," therefore making removal
improper. 69 To the First Circuit, the distressing implication of StarPublishing
was that if decisions of the Board were final, binding, and non-removable,then
it would be forced to deprive the Board of jurisdiction, lest a defendant be
denied access to a federal forum. 70 Therefore, the court had to prove that an
action before a state administrative agency was removable.7 1
Even if state agency proceedings were not removable, the First Circuit
conceded that defendants still had access to a federal forum because, in order to
enforce its orders, the PRLRB had to petition the Puerto Rico Supreme Court,
which would allow the litigant access to a definitive "state court" and
subsequent access to a federal forum through removal.72 Seeking removal once
an administrative action has been appealed to a state court for de novo review
or enforcement had been the standard practice of litigants.73 The First Circuit,

jurisdiction can only be vested in a state tribunal from which there may be removal to a federal
court. Id. The district court dismissed Volkswagen's complaint, holding that the PRLRB had
jurisdiction of the complaint and that the removal statute did not contemplate removal from
administrative agencies but only "state courts." Id. at 1049. Volkswagen appealed, but only on
the issue of whether the PRLRB had jurisdiction of the complaint, although the First Circuit
entertained the removability issue as well. Volkswagen, 454 F.2d at 41.
67. Volkswagen, 454 F.2d at 41.
68. See Star Publ'g Corp. v. P.R. Newspaper Guild, 303 F. Supp. 760,761 (D.P.R. 1969)
(holding that removal from administrative bodies was not contemplated by the federal removal
statute and therefore removal from the PRLRB was improper).
69. Id. (emphasis added). The district court applied the reasoning advanced by California
Packing Corp. v. LL.W.U Local 142, 253 F. Supp. 597 (D. Haw. 1966), that "removal from
administrative bodies [was] not contemplated by the removal statute." StarPubl'g Corp., 303
F. Supp. at 761.
70. Volkswagen, 454 F.2d at 42.
71. See Michael Katz, The Consequences of Removalfrom State Labor Boards into the
FederalCourts: Volkswagen Reconsidered, 17 REV. JuR. U.I.P.R. 111, 116 (1982) (stating that
"[iln effect, the court held that the Board had jurisdiction because the case was removable rather
than removable because the Board had jurisdiction").
72. Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir.
1972).
73. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the
Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 660-66 (1999) (discussing historical practice of
allowing lower federal courts to review initial state agency action when states provide for de
novo review).

1844

66 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1831 (2009)

however, assumed that a federal district court would give deference to the
PRLRB's findings, thereby still depriving a litigant of his "critical" right to
have facts found in a federal forum.74 The court also believed that federal court
deference on appeal "would place a federal court in an improper posture vis-Avis a non-federal agency, 7 5 but this argument has since been rejected by the
Supreme Court.76
Thus, the court essentially justified its conclusion that proceedings before
the PRLRB had to be removable based only on the fact that a litigant could not
be granted access to a federal forum until after an appeal from the PRLRB's
decision.77 The First Circuit concluded that, because courts are required to
interpret CBAs according to federal law, a rehearing de novo in federal court
would be redundant, would force the litigant to endure preliminary proceedings
before the PRLRB, would penalize the litigant's right to a federal forum, and
would reduce the PRLRB proceeding to a charade if a litigant made known his
intentions ultimately to seek a rehearing de novo in the federal court upon
removal.78 These consequences, for the First Circuit, compelled it to conclude
that removal of the initial proceeding before the PRLRB was proper.79
The court then attempted to dismantle the reasoning of Star Publishing.
The court indicated that Star Publishing had relied on the questionable
precedent of American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, MarineDivision,80 a case
which subsequently had been overturned by Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No.
735.
With little actual precedent on which to base its reasoning, the First
Circuit concluded that Star Publishing was left only to invoke an
"unquestioning reliance on the state's characterization of its chosen instrument
as a board or a court" to justify its conclusion that removal from state agencies
74. Volkswagen, 454 F.2d at 42.
75. Id.
76. See City ofChi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156,171 (1997) (concluding that
"[n]othing in § 1367(a) suggests that district courts are without supplemental jurisdiction over
claims seeking [deferential] review of local administrative determinations").
77. Volkswagen, 454 F.2d at 42-43.
78. Id.
79. Id.at 43.
80. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., 338 F.2d 837, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1964)
(holding improper removal of case to enjoin union's violation of no strike provision of contract
from Pennsylvania state court because the case did not arise under a federal law, and thus the
federal court had no subject matter jurisdiction).
81. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (holding that dispute concerning no strike clause in CBA
arose under laws of the United States, and therefore the dispute was removable from the state to
the federal court).
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was improper.82 The First Circuit, however, appears to have misunderstood
Avco Corp. and American Dredging.
First, the Volkswagen court argued that American Dredgingstood for the
proposition that "no removal [of CBA disputes] was permitted even from state
courts. 8 3 A closer reading of American Dredging,however, reveals that, in the
case, the Third Circuit concluded removal from the state court was improper
because it thought that the collective bargaining "no-strike" clause at issue in
the case did not ariseunderfederal law. 84 In turn, Avco Corp. held that CBA
"no-strike" clauses do arise under federal law, namely Section 301(a), and
therefore actions involving such clauses, brought in state court, can be removed
The First Circuit's
pursuant to federal question jurisdiction.85
(mis)characterization of American Dredging allowed it to argue with greater
force that Star Publishing was left with no substantive legal precedent to
support its claim that removal was not contemplated from state agencies.86 The
First Circuit's confusion over American Dredging,however, tends to discredit
the force of this statement.
Turning its discussion to Upshur County and Tool &Die Makers, the First
Circuit agreed with the Tool & Die Makers court that a state should not be able
to bifurcate the traditional judicial function between a board and a court,
thereby defeating a litigant's right to a federal forum.88 The First Circuit stated
that "the [PRLRB]'s procedures and enforcement powers, the locus of
traditional jurisdiction over breaches of contract, and the respective state and

82. Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 43 (lst Cir.
1972).
83. Id.
84. See Am. Dredging Co., 338 F.2d at 846 (concluding that the case "was not one
'arising under' [Section] 301(a), or any other law of the United States, so as to permit removal
under § 1441, since the complaint was cast solely on a state-created right to bring suit for
violation of a collective bargaining agreement").
85. See Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 560 (explaining that the dispute "under this collective
bargaining agreement is one arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of
the removal statute" and that "this suit is within the 'original jurisdiction' of the District Court
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and (b)") (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Volkswagen, 454 F.2d at 43 ("What remains of Star Publishing and California
Packing after Avco and Boys Market, then, is an unquestioning reliance on the state's
characterization of its chosen instrument as a board or a court, even for the purpose of a federal
removal statute in the context of federal substantive law.").
87. See Star Publ'g Corp. v. P.R. Newspaper Guild, 303 F. Supp. 760,761 (D.P.R. 1969)
(noting the futility of saying that a district court has subject matter jurisdiction when it does not
have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case on the merits).
88. Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.

1972).
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federal interests in the subject matter and in the provision of a forum" should
determine whether an agency functions as a "court" for removal purposes,
rather than a "Steinian rendering of a board is a board is a board. 8 9 The court,
however, did limit its functional test to cases where the PRLRB exercised
concurrent jurisdiction under Section 301(a), emphasizing that it was not
questioning the legal status of the PRLRB "as to any of its other functions,
jurisdictions, or procedures," but was attempting to reconcile the "removal
statute with the federal law relating to [Section] 301 and its implementation in
both state and federal forums." 90
The remainder of the court's analysis focused on supporting its conclusion
that the PRLRB fulfilled the requirements of the functional test: the proceeding
was interpartes, there was a complaint, the PRLRB lacked legislative power
under Section 301 (a), the PRLRB governed the proceeding in an adjudicative
format, and the courts traditionally maintained jurisdiction over breach of
contract cases. 91
The only factor weighing against the PRLRB's
characterization as a "court" was its lack of enforcement power, much like the
WERB in Tool & Die Makers, but the First Circuit appeared unbothered by this
point as well. 92 Finally, after comparing the respective state and federal
interests, the court concluded that the federal interest far outweighed Puerto
Rico's interest:
The state interest after Lincoln Mills, Dowd Box, and Avco is indeed a
limited one ....Substantive law is purely federal, and while both state and
federal governments may create forums, an action brought before a state
forum is, in general, removable to a federal court. Nor do the states have in
practice the opportunity to go their own ways which they lack in theory,
since a state proceeding is in any event removable at the enforcement stage.
Any advantage which the state might find in the specialized expertise of its
Board or in expedited procedures would then be lost.... The interest in
the federal forum to decide questions of federal substantive
93 law.., would
thus be burdened without substantial benefit to the state.
Thus, the court held that the PRLRB, in conducting proceedings for breach of
CBAs under Section 301 (a), functioned as a court, therefore making removal
proper pursuant to § 1441.94

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.

93.

Id.at 44-45.

94.

Id.at 45.
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C. The Seventh CircuitAdopts the FunctionalTest
In 1979, the Seventh Circuit adopted the functional test in Floeterv. C.W
Transport, Inc.95 The plaintiffs had appealed both the district court's grant of
summary judgment and the propriety of removal from the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission (WERC), arguing that the WERC was not a
"state court" for purposes of the removal statute.96 At the outset, the Seventh
Circuit observed that not only had the Tool & Die Makers court applied the
functional test in an almost identical action but that its decision had been "cited
with approval in several subsequent discussions of the question"-including
Volkswagen-although the Seventh Circuit cited to only one other United States
97
District Court case in support of its observation.
The court then fashioned its own functional test by stating that "the title
given a state tribunal is not determinative; it is necessary to evaluate the functions,
powers, and procedures of the state tribunal and consider these factors along with
the respective state and federal interest in the subject matter and in the provision
of the fontm. ' 98 Applying this fact intensive test, the Seventh Circuit readily
concluded that the WERC functioned as a "court" while presiding over collective
bargaining disputes. 99 Comparing the state and federal interests also confirmed
the court's conclusion. 100 According to the court, "the state's interest in providing
a 'convenient and expeditious tribunal to adjudicate the rights and interest of
95. See Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(holding proper the removal of a proceeding before the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission (WERC) to federal district court).
96. Id. at 1101. Fourteen employees brought the complaint against the defendants, the
plaintiffs' employer and the plaintiffs' union, alleging that the "union and the employer
conspired to give 'superseniority' to two employees in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement" between the union and the defendant-employer. Id.
97. Id. at 1101-02. In support of its statement, the Seventh Circuit cited to Martin v.
Schwerman Trucking Co., a case that briefly discussed the split of authority on removal from
state agencies. See Martin v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 446 F. Supp. 1130, 1131 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (adopting functional test). The district court decided that the "flexible approach" of the
functional test "is consistent with the intent of the removal statute" and thus held that the
WERC-an agency that would follow judicial procedures, would be obligated to apply federal
law to collective bargaining claims, would not be exercising any sort of special expertise, and
would be adjudicating a dispute that could be brought in Wisconsin state court-functioned as a
"court," making proper removal of collective bargaining claims to federal court. Id.
98. Floeter,597 F.2d at 1102.
99. Id. The court reasoned that the underlying dispute was a breach of contract, that the
dispute could have been brought in state or federal court, that federal law would be applied
regardless of the forum, and that the WERC's procedures were substantially similar to those of a
traditional court. Id.
100. Id.

1848

66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1831 (2009)

parties to a labor dispute' is not substantially greater than the state's interest in
maintaining any court system and does not outweigh the defendant's right to
remove the action to federal court."' 0'1 The Seventh Circuit, like the First Circuit,
stressed that its holding was limited to the facts of this particular case, and
furthermore, that other actions brought before the agency "may involve different
state and federal interests, or a different agency role, and a weighing of the
competing interests in those cases might
well result in a determination that those
1 02
cases cannot be properly removed."
The First and the Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals are the only two courts
of appeals to adopt the functional test. 10 3 Multiple district courts, however, also
have adopted the test and have applied it to other state agency proceedings
besides disputes involving CBAs, even though both Volkswagen and Floeter
limited their holdings and analyses to such cases. District courts applying the
"functional test" include district courts in the First Circuit,"°4 the Fourth Circuit,'0°
101. Id. (quoting Layton Sch. of Art & Design v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 82
Wis. 2d 324, 341 (1978)).
102. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summaryjudgment to the defendants.
Id.
103. See Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (D. Md. 2005)
(observing that "[a]t least two circuits have adopted the functional test").
104. See Ins. Comm'r of P.R. v. Doral Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 05-2230CCC, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 80333, at *5-10 (D.P.R. Oct. 31, 2006) (reaffirming use of functional test and
concluding that a proceeding instituted by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner against
defendant satisfied both prongs of the functional test to allow for removal).
105. See Woodruff v. Hartford Life Group Ins. Co., 378 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548-49 (D. Md.
2005) (discussing split among courts regarding the functional test but ultimately deciding
propriety of removal on a different issue); Gottlieb, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 579-82 (applying
functional test to proceeding before Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) and finding that
Maryland's substantial interest in enforcing its insurance licensing and regulatory scheme
eclipsed any federal interest in the provision of a forum, although the MIA used many court-like
procedures); Rockville Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d
673,676-80 (D. Md. 2002) (applying functional test to proceeding before the Maryland Motor
Vehicle Administration (MVA) and finding that the MVA lacks traditional judicial powers, and
the state's strong interest in enforcing its vehicle-distribution licensing scheme dwarfs any
federal interest in the provision of a forum); Ginn v. N.C. Dep't of Corrs., 829 F. Supp. 804,
806-07 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (applying functional test to discrimination claim before the North
Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings and finding that both the state and federal interests
implicated in Title VII claims militated against finding the action removable, although the OAH
has court-like powers, functions, and procedures). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has adopted
the functional test in the context of the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2006).
Kolibash v. Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. Bar, 872 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir. 1989). Courts,
however, have held that § 1442 should be interpreted more broadly than § 1441 to adequately
protect the important government interests involved. See, e.g., Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777,
779 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e have stated that § 1442 should be interpreted broadly to fully
protect the important governmental interests involved."). For a criticism of the Kolibash
decision, see Franklin D. Cleckley, Clearly Erroneous: The Fourth Circuit's Decision to
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the Fifth Circuit,' °6 the Sixth Circuit,'0 7 the Seventh Circuit,108 the Eighth
Circuit, 10 9 and the Eleventh Circuit. 0l The test even has spawned mini-splits
within circuits that have yet to have the question decided by the circuit's court
of appeals.'
Interestingly, most courts to adopt and to apply the test never
find in favor of the case remaining in federal district court, usually due to a

Uphold Removal ofa State-BarDisciplinaryProceeding Under the Federal-OfficerRemoval
Statute, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 577 (1990).
106. See Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 128 F. Supp. 2d
975, 979 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (addressing the propriety of removal of a complaint before the
Mississippi Motor Vehicles Commission and assuming "for the sake of argument that the way to
identify [whether a state administrative agency is properly considered a state court for removal
purposes] is by resort to the 'functional test"').
107. See Ford Motor Co. v. McCullion, No. C2-88-142, 1989 WL 267215, at *2-3 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 14, 1989) (concluding that "under some circumstances, administrative agencies are
'state courts' for purposes of removal" and finding improper removal from the Ohio Motor
Vehicle Dealers Board because the state's "substantial interest in preserving the validity of its
administrative infrastructure" completely outweighed the "lack of a federal interest").
108. See Wirtz Corp. v. United Distillers & Vintners N.A., Inc., 224 F.3d 708,712-14 (7th
Cir. 2000) (applying functional test to a proceeding before the Illinois Liquor Control
Commission (ILCC) and finding that it was not removable because Illinois's interest in
regulating its alcohol statutory scheme outweighed defendant's interest in a federal forum and it
did not function as a court); R.J. Distrib. Co. v. Sutter Home Winery, Inc., No. 99C3836, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11890, at *4-7 (N.D. I11.July 27, 1999) (applying functional test to a
proceeding before the ILCC and finding that the ILCC was not functionally a court because it
was not authorized to provide full judicial relief and there was a substantial state interest in the
regulation of alcohol); In re Petition to Detach Prop., 874 F. Supp. 200,202-03 (N.D. I11.1995)
(applying functional test to an annexation proceeding before county school board of trustees and
finding that the board of trustees, as an arm of the state legislature, is an administrative agency
and not akin to a state court).
109. See In re Registration of Edudata Corp., 599 F. Supp. 1089, 1090-91 (D. Minn. 1984)
(holding that a proceeding before the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce is an
administrative proceeding not subject to removal after considering the functional test and the
competing federal and state interests).
110. CompareBellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280,
1283-85 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (assuming that "a state tribunal that functions as a court is a 'State
court"' and finding that the Florida Public Service Commission functioned generally as an
administrative agency-sometimes resolving disputes between carriers only as an ancillary
function-and thus removal was improper), with Johnson v. Albertson's LLC, No.
3:08cv236/MCR/MD, 2008 WL 3286988, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6,2008) (agreeing with Ninth
Circuit that "[tihere is nothing in the text of § 1441 which suggests that Congress intended to
authorize the removal of cases from state administrative agencies. . . ,even where the agency
performs ordinary judicial functions"), and Civil Rights Div. v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No.
08-60493-CIV, 2008 WL 2616154, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 15, 2008) (rejecting the "functional
test" as going "beyond the language of [§] 1441, which does not authorize the removal of
proceedings from administrative agencies").
111. Supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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strong state interest in the regulation of the subject matter and a comparatively
2
weaker federal interest in the provision of an alternate federal forum."l
Thus, it appears that the final test to emerge from these cases is a
bifurcated one focusing on the functionality ofthe agency's proceeding, with an
even stronger emphasis on a balancing test between the implicated state and
federal interests. 1 3 This second, "more critical inquiry" focuses on the "state's
interests in using administrative agencies as whole, against any federal claim
present in the action." 1 4 Federal courts must consider "whether the state has
inherently remedial or ministerial interests in the dispute and whether15 federal
interests are more intimately or locally connected with the dispute."' '
V. Courts Rejecting the FunctionalTest
A. The Beginning of the Split
Seven years after the decision in Tool & Die Makers, another district
court, in CaliforniaPacking Corp. v. .L. W. ULocal 142,116 disagreed with the
functional test, thus commencing the split in the lower federal courts over the
validity of removal from state administrative agencies.1 1 7 The United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii had to decide whether a complaint filed
by the California Packing Corporation against the defendant union, alleging
unfair labor practices stemming from a violation of the parties' CBA, could be
removed from the Hawaii Employment Relations Board (HERB) to federal
district court. 1 8 The district court concluded that removal of the employer's
action was "wide of the mark."11 9
First, the court observed that the removal statutes refer only to removal
from state courts and do not contemplate removal from state administrative
112. Supra notes 105-09.
113. See Ford Motor Co. v. McCullion, No. C2-88-142, 1989 WL 267215, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 14, 1989) (explaining a defendant must show that "the functions, powers, and
procedures are those of a state tribunal" and that "the respective state interests in litigating the
matter as a whole are subordinate to any unique federal interest, in light of the subject matter
and in provision of a forum").
114. Id. at*3.
115. Id.
116. See Cal. Packing Corp. v. I.L.W.U. Local 142,253 F. Supp. 597,598 (D. Haw. 1966)
(holding improper removal of action from Hawaii Employment Relations Board).
117. See id. at 599 (noting its disagreement with the Tool & Die Makers court's reasoning).
118. Id. at 598.
119. Id.
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bodies.120 The court then criticized the Tool & Die Makers opinion, noting its
failure to cite to any other removal cases endorsing the functional test, and
finding that in its assessment, the Tool & Die Makers reasoning was
"strained."' 2 1 It summarily granted the employer's motion to remand the
complaint back to the HERB. 22
B. TemporaryEmergency Court of Appeals Finds Interruptionof Agency
ProceedingsImproper
Shortly after the First Circuit's decision in Volkswagen, the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals took up removal from state agencies in County of
Nassau v. Cost ofLiving Council.123 Unhappy with a pay increase given by the
County of Nassau to the Nassau County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association,
the Cost of Living Council (COLC) investigated the pay increase and issued a
124
notice of challenge and a temporary order limiting pay increases to 5.5%.
The COLC's actions prompted the plaintiffs to file a series of petitions and
actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District ofNew York,
purposefully seeking to interrupt the COLC's investigation and to obtain
25
injunctions against the COLC's temporary and final orders.1
First, the court of appeals surmised that the district court had issued its
26
series of rulings in order to interrupt the COLC's administrative proceedings.1
Thus, as to the ordered removal of the proceedings from the COLC to federal
district court, the court of appeals stated that "there was no basis for removal of
120. Id. at 598-99.
121. Id. at 599.
122. Id.
123. See County ofNassau v. Cost of Living Council, 499 F.2d 1340, 1343 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1974) (holding that there was no basis for removal of the proceedings before the Cost
of Living Council). Congress created the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals in 1971 in its
amendments to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, securing the American economy
through the stabilization of"prices, rents, wages, salaries, dividends, and interest." Economic
Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, Sec. 2, § 202, 85 Stat. 743, 744.
Absent specific provisions, the court of appeals held exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals from
the district courts in cases and controversies arising under the Act. Id. § 21 l(b)(2), 85 Stat. at
749. Eventually, Congress abolished the Temporary Court of Appeals. See Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 102(d), 106 Stat. 4506, 4507 ("The
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals... is abolished, effective 6 months after the date of
the enactment of this Act.").
124. County of Nassau, 499 F.2d at 1342.
125. Id. at 1342-43.
126. Id. at 1343.
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the unfinished COLC proceedings to the Eastern District of New york."'127
While not directly referencing the functional test, the court explained that
neither Section 211 (a) of the Economic Stabilization Act 128 nor § 1441(a)
"contemplate removal from other court proceedings to a federal district court;
they do not apply to the interruption of administrative proceedings of the
COLC."' 129 The district court's rulings had "prematurely interfered with the
normal course of administrative proceedings, a practice ordinarily
disapproved." 130 The court of appeals remanded the proceedings back to the
COLC because there were no circumstances
which could have justified the
3
district court's actions in the case.1 '
C. The Third CircuitHedges: Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc.
In 1993, the Third Circuit, in Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc.,132
had to determine whether the term "state court" applied to actions filed in the
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles (Board). 133 After the Board had consolidated
the plaintiffs complaints arising out of the termination of a franchise
agreement, the respondent Saab removed the action to federal district court,
which subsequently denied remand.' s4 Prior to Sun Buick, district courts in
35
the Third Circuit had adopted the functional test in addressing the problem. 1
127. Id.
128. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, sec. 2,
§ 211 (a), 85 Stat. 743, 748.
129. County of Nassau v. Cost of Living Council, 499 F.2d 1340, 1343 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1974).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding improper removal from Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles (Board) because, under any
circumstances, it failed to qualify as a court due to its lack ofjudicial attributes).
133. Id.at 1261.
134. Id.
135. See Corwin Jeep Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 670 F. Supp. 591,
593 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (observing that "[i]n the construction of federal statutes dealing with
proceedings in State court, it is clear that the Supreme Court... has adopted a functional rather
than a literal test"). The district court indicated that the removability of a proceeding before an
administrative agency is "determined by reference to the procedures and functions of the State
tribunal rather than the name by which the tribunal is designated." Id.; see also Edelson v.
Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1979) (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (discussing use of
functional test by other courts and arguing that the Pennsylvania Arbitration Panels for Health
Care should be considered a "court" for the purposes of removal). The dissent in Edelson
argued that the majority's opinion failed to address the functional test, as it reasoned that the
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The Third
Circuit raised the issue of whether the Board was a "court" sua
36
sponte.
The Third Circuit observed that, on its face, the removal statute is limited
to cases pending before state "courts," which should be dispositive because the
Board is not a "court." 137 In questioning the reasoning of the Tool & Die
Makers court, the Third Circuit recognized the use of the functional test by
other federal courts, but reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding in Upshur
County-thata named court is not necessarily a "court" for removal purposesdoes not mean that the Supreme Court adopted the standard. 38 For support of
this observation, the court noted that other Supreme Court decisions from the
UpshurCounty era did not broadly adopt a functional test by which an agency
is treated as a court for removal purposes simply because it is akin to a court in
some instances. 39 "In those cases, when the Court held that removal was
proper it was
careful to note that the body in question was a judicial body under
40
state law.'
The court ultimately hedged between adopting and rejecting the functional
test by reasoning that, because it had never definitively held an administrative
agency to be a "court" in other contexts, it did not have to decide whether
removal under § 1441(a) would ever be permissible in an exceptional case
because the Board "would not qualify under any circumstances."'' 4 1 The Board
is an agency that enforces and administers the Board of Vehicles Act. 142 It also
lacks the traditional attributes of a "court"--disinterestedness, separation from
the executive, and learnedness in the law143-and generally, the Third Circuit
arbitration remedy was a substantive condition precedent to suit, and therefore the Erie doctrine
required that the federal court adhere to this condition under state law. Id.at 146. For a critique
of the majority's reasoning in Edelson v. Soricelli, see Note, Mandatory State Malpractice
ArbitrationBoardsand the ErieProblem: Edelson v. Soricelli, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1562 (1980).
136. Sun Buick, 26 F.3d at 1261.
137. Id.
138. Id.at 1263.
139. Id. (citing Comm'rs of Road Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 257
U.S. 547, 556-57 (1922); Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S.
239, 250-51 (1905)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1264.
142. Id. In this capacity, "[i]t regulates the licensing of salesperson, dealers, brokers and
manufacturers," as well as "investigates allegations of wrongful acts" and prosecutes
unauthorized practices, which are powers characteristic of an administrative agency, not a court.
Id. at 1265.
143. Id. at 1266. The court also distinguished the Board based upon the composition of its
adjudicators, which included new car dealers, used car dealers, mobile home dealers,
recreational dealers, and motorcycle dealers. Id. at 1266. The court contrasted the Board's
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has recognized that the word "court" in a statute refers "'only to the tribunals of
the judiciary and not to those of an executive agency with quasi-judicial
powers."'144 The court also described the Board's absence from sections in the
Pennsylvania Constitution and in Pennsylvania statutes related to the state court
system.1 45 Furthermore, according to the Third Circuit's own precedent, the
Board could never be a court because it lacks the power to award damages or
full injunctive relief, a power any equivalent Pennsylvania state "court" would
have.'46
Finally, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that, because the Board
was acting in an adjudicatory manner, rather than in an administrative one, in
resolving the specific dispute between the parties in this case, removal was
proper based on the nature of the proceeding. 147 The defendant's argument
improperly conflated the "civil action" and "State court" requirements of the
removal statute: "State court" requires an analysis of the Board's status as a
whole, while the nature of the proceedings before the Board determines
whether the proceeding is a "civil action."1 48 The Board's generalstatus is not
one of a court, therefore making
it "irrelevant whether the proceeding may
49
qualify as a 'civil action." 1
Ultimately, despite its "unrelenting criticism," the Third Circuit never
adopted or rejected the functional test.150 However, in DeLallo v. Teamsters
Local Union #776,151 an opinion issued approximately two months after Sun
Buick, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
concluded that, "if squarely presented with the question, the Third Circuit
would refuse to apply the functional test and would not allow removal from a
composition with a section in the Pennsylvania Constitution that requires judges to devote full
time to their judicial duties. Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(a)).
144. Id. at 1264 (quoting Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 217 (3d Cir.
1979)).
145. Id.at 1266.
146. Id. at 1265-66.
147. Id.at 1267.
148. Id.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. DeLallo v. Teamsters Local Union #776, No. CIV.A. 94-3875, 1994 WL423873, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1994).
151. See id. at *5 (holding improper removal from Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission (PHRC) because although it is acting as an adjudicator in the instant case,
implying that the case is a "civil action," it does not follow that the PHRC is a state "court" for
removal purposes); accord Borough of Olyphant v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d
601, 602 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (noting that "the Third Circuit has questioned the validity of the
functional test and its adoption in other circuits").
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state administrative agency."' 152 The Third Circuit may have been
uncomfortable completely rejecting the functional test because only a decade
earlier it had applied its own functional test to interpret whether the phrase
"state court," in the context of the Clean Air Act (CAA) 153 and the Clean Water
55
1
54
Act (CWA),1 encompassed state administrative actions.

To promote public participation in enforcing the CWA and the CAA,
Congress provided both with citizen suit enforcement provisions, but
preempted the suits if the EPA or a state is "diligently prosecuting a civil or
criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to require
Coal Co., 157
compliance ... ,,156 The Third Circuit, in Baughman v. Bradford
applied its own variation of the functional test.158 It observed that the word
"court" generally does not refer to an executive agency with quasi-judicial
powers.' 59 But by extrapolating from the First Circuit's reasoning in
Volkswagen, the Third Circuit concluded that an agency may be a "court" if its
"powers and characteristics make such a classification necessary to achieve
statutory goals."' 60 In applying its test to the Pennsylvania Environmental
Hearing Board (PEHB), the Third Circuit determined that the PEHB failed to
advance Congress's statutory goals for two reasons: Not only did the PEHB
152. DeLallo, 1994 WL 423873, at *3.
153. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006)).
154. Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006)).
155. See Randall S. Schipper, Administrative Preclusionof EnvironmentalCitizen Suits,
1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 163, 168 (noting that "[t]he first question one must address in interpreting
the citizen suit preclusion provision is the meaning of the word 'court"').
156. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against
Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens: Part One: Statutory
Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 401, 408 (2004) (explaining that
because it was "[n]ot confident that federal and state authorities would fully enforce against
violations of the statutes, [Congress] also authorized citizens to enforce through an ingenious
new device, the citizen suit provision"). Both the CAA and the CWA preclusion provisions are
interpreted interchangeably. See Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57,63 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act was explicitly modeled on the
similarly worded [S]ection 304 of the Clean Air Act.").
157. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215,219 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a
prior enforcement action before the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board did not
constitute a prior diligent prosecution in a court of a state for the purposes of precluding a
subsequent civil suit); see also Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge &
Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir. 1985) (interpreting identical preclusion provision in
the CWA and holding that an EPA enforcement action was not a "court" proceeding).
158. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 217-18.
159. Id.

160.

Id. at 217.

1856

66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1831 (2009)

lack the ability to award relief equivalent to that which the EPA could secure
in federal court, but the PEHB also lacked the ability to allow for citizen
intervention as a matter1 of
right-a right citizens have when the EPA files an
61
court.
federal
in
action
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Friends of the Earth v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.,162 interpreted the CWA's preclusion provision
according to the statute's plain language. 63 The statute "unambiguously and
without qualification" refers to an action in a court of the United States or a
state. 164 The CWA's legislative history indicated that Congress meant for
citizens to have a clear role in its enforcement, and allowing "court" to be
interpreted to include agency proceedings was contrary to both plain
language and congressional intent.' 65 Additionally, in other statutes,
Congress explicitly had provided that either an administrative proceeding or
a court action would preclude citizen suits. 166 Thus, in accordance with the
statute's plain language, the Second Circuit held that citizen suits would be
precluded only by actions filed in a state or federal court, not in
administrative agencies. 67 Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals have agreed with the reasoning of the Second Circuit,16 8 and there is
161. Id. at219.
162. See Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that in accordance with the plain language of Section 505(b)(1)(B) of the CWA, only a
prosecution by the EPA or a state initiated and diligently prosecuted in a state or federal court
will operate to preclude a citizen suit).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 62.
165. Id. at 62-63; see also Schipper, supra note 155, at 169 (discussing the Second
Circuit's conclusion that there is nothing to indicate that "Congress had any intention different
from that which the words convey").
166. Friends of the Earth, 768 F.2d at 63 (emphasis added); see also Miller, supranote
156, at 437 ("By referring to both judicial and administrative enforcement actions in the same
provisions or in different preclusions in the same statute, Congress indicated that it knew they
were different types of actions, knew how to describe each, and meant its references to each as
discrete types of actions."); id. at 442-43 (discussing the fact that Congress "amended CWA
[Section] 505(a) to cross reference the [Section] 309(g)s bar on citizen suits for administratively
assessed penalties.., reinforcing its intent that 'court' in [Section] 505 does not include
administrative agencies").
167. Friendsof the Earth, 768 F.2d at 63.
168. See Texans United for a Safe Econ. Educ. Fund v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 207
F.3d 789, 794-95 (5th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with Second and Ninth Circuits that the plain
meaning of the preclusion provision in the CWA refers only to a court of the United States or a
state, thus excluding prior administrative actions); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834
F.2d 1517, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that previous administrative action taken against
defendant did not preclude a subsequent citizen suit because the plain language of the CWA
refers only to "courts").
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to the plain language is more "faithful" and makes
agreement that adherence
' 169
more "policy sense."
Perhaps its adoption of a functional test in the citizen suit context explains
the Third Circuit's reluctance in Sun Buick to reject officially the use of the
functional test in the removal context, calling its discussion of the functional
test in Baughman and subsequent cases "dictum,"'1 70 as well as acknowledging
that its reasoning had been rejected by both the Second and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals.' 7 ' In Sun Buick, it did appear to intimate that it might not
be inclined to follow its Baughmanreasoning if presented with the issue again,
which would be more consistent with its criticism of the functional test in the
by
removal context. 72 It ultimately tried to remedy any apparent inconsistency
73
removal.
and
provisions
suit
citizen
of
contexts
different
the
noting
D. The Ninth CircuitRejects the Functional Test
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit, in Oregon Bureau of Labor andIndustriesex
rel. Richardson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.,' 74 resolutely rejected the
use of the functional test.175 The Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries
(BOL) had served U.S. West with unlawful employment discrimination
charges after its employee Darryl Richardson filed a complaint alleging
discrimination against him for accompanying an Oregon state safety
compliance officer on an investigation of a U.S. West facility. 76 After BOLl
169. Miller, supra note 156, at 443.
170. See Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting that it "need not decide the viability of the dictum in these cases"); Miller, supra note
156, at 438 (observing in the context of the citizen suit preclusion provisions that the Third
Circuit "may subsequently have repudiated its reasoning in favor of a plain English
interpretation").
171. Sun Buick, 26 F.3d at 1264.
172. See id. (acknowledging that "[e]ven if[it] were still inclined" to follow Baughman's
reasoning, the removal context was sufficiently distinguishable (emphasis added)); Miller, supra
note 156, at 439 (observing that in Sun Buick, the "court was clearly uncomfortable applying its
'functional equivalent' doctrine" in the removal context).
173. Sun Buick, 26 F.3d at 1264; see also Miller, supra note 156, at 439 (explaining that,
in Sun Buick, the Third Circuit "strongly questioned the viability" of its precedents in the
context of the CAA and CWA but stated "that it would take an en banc court to jettison them").
174. See Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc., 288
F.3d 414,419 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding improper removal from the Oregon Bureau of Labor and
Industries because § 144 1(a) "does not authorize removal of proceedings from an administrative
agency").

175.

Id.

176.

Id. at415.

1858

66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1831 (2009)

scheduled a hearing, U.S. West removed the action, alleging that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction under Section 301(a).' 77 The district court
denied BOLI's motion for remand, citing to both the complete preemption
doctrine of
Section 301 (a) and to BOLl's functionality as a "court" for removal
178
purposes.

The Ninth Circuit approached the question of removal as a statutory
question: Is the plain language of § 1441(a) susceptible to ambiguity or is it
definite and plain? 179 The court indicated that the phrase in the removal statute,
"state court," meant just what it said:
We look first to the statutory language. If it is clear and consistent with the
statutory scheme, the plain language is conclusive and our inquiry goes no
further.... The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) limits removal to
cases pending before a "state court." U.S. West does not argue that the
term "state court" is ambiguous, nor do we think that it is. The term is clear
and consistent with the overall statutory scheme for removals because it is
used repeatedly throughout the removal statutes and is the only term used in
reference to the tribunal from which removal may be taken.
The court agreed with the Third Circuit that the statutory language of§ 1441(a)
should be dispositive, and because all the parties agreed that BOLl was not a
court, although it may conduct 8court-like adjudications, the action against the
defendant was not removable.' 1
The Ninth Circuit then provided three reasons why it refused to adopt the
functional test. First, although the construction of the removal statute is a
matter of federal, not state, law, the functional test goes beyond the plain
language of § 1441, as it is a "judicially-developed analysis that neither appears
in, nor is necessarily implied by, the statutory language."'182 Second, precedent
in the Ninth Circuit required courts, in interpreting statutes, to not reach
"beyond clear and consistent statutory language," and because the Ninth Circuit
found § 1441(a) to be clear and consistent, it refused to adopt the test.'83
Finally, it bothered the court that the adoption of the functional test
84
necessarily transformed the "meaning and reach" of the removal statute.
Instead of only allowing removal from a "state court," the test would allow
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.at417.
Id.at417-18.
Id.at418.
Id.
Id.at419.
Id.
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removal from "any tribunal that acts as a state court," or "any tribunal having
court-like functions," or some other similar phrase.' 8 5 Allowing removal in
these situations shifts the inquiry from one into the "nature of the tribunalto
one into the nature of theproceeding,"186 the same concern voiced by the Third
Circuit in Sun Buick. Consequently, as the number of state agency proceedings
continues to increase, an improper focus on the agency proceeding would
expand removal jurisdiction, directly contradicting the mandate "that removal
statutes.., be strictly construed so as to limit, not expand, federal
jurisdiction."' 187 The court also agreed with the Third Circuit that just because
UpshurCounty held that a court is not necessarily a court for removal purposes,
does not mean necessarily that the Supreme Court endorsed the functional
test. 188 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, held that § 1441 does not authorize
removal of proceedings from an administrative agency, regardless of how akin
its proceedings are to a "court.' 89 The BOLI was not a court and thus removal
from it was impermissible.' 0
VI. Upshur County Did Not Adopt a FunctionalTest
Courts allowing removal from a state agency sustain much of their
conclusion on the Supreme Court's alleged endorsement of a functional test in
Upshur County.191 But the Court did not endorse or impliedly endorse this
standard. First, the Court resolved whether a property appraisal became a "suit"
at law when it was appealed to the Upshur county court. 192 To justify its
conclusion that the appeal was not a "suit" at law, the Supreme Court focused
on the fact that the so-named county court was not a "court" because it lacked
judicial powers, and in reviewing the appraiser's original valuation, it did not
conduct a proceeding interpartes.193 The original appraisal and the appeal
185.

Id.

186. Id.
187. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir.
1999)).

188.

Id

189.

Id.

190. Id. at 419-20. The court declined to reach the complete preemption doctrine relied
upon by the district court as providing it with original jurisdiction because the "state court"
requirement of § 1441(a) was not satisfied. Id. at 420.
191. See supranotes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Tool & Die Makers
court's view that Upshur County endorsed a functional test).
192. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (stating Upshur County's argument).
193. Supra notes 39, 44-45 and accompanying text. As the Third Circuit reiterated, the
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were executive and administrative county affairs, and thus, the appeal was not a
"suit" at law, a separate requirement for removal.' 94
It also is unlikely that the Supreme Court-aware of the dramatic increases
in federal dockets resulting from the expansive removal provisions of the
Judiciary Act of 1875--sought to provide further federal court access to
complaints filed originally in state commissions. 19 Additionally, the Court's
analysis in Upshur County bears no similarity to the functional test adopted by
the First and Seventh Circuits. For one thing, those courts focused on the
similarity of the tribunal's procedures to those used in state courts, while the
Supreme Court's discussion in Upshur focused on whether the State of West
Virginia had vested judicial power-the power to determine questions of law
and fact-in the county court, as well as whether the county court conducted
the proceeding interpartes.196 There is little discussion of the county court's
procedures in Upshur County other than a mention that the county court may
swear witnesses during the appeal proceeding, which the Supreme Court
regarded as irrelevant because appraisers are often empowered to do so without
altering the nature of their appraisal.197 Furthermore, focusing on the agency's
procedures is wholly improper because a state legislature could easily alter a
tribunal's procedures to block a defendant's access to removal through the
functional test, and procedure-based removal could lead to removal of
proceedings from agencies with an undeniably legislative purpose.' 98 The
Supreme Court held in other cases from the UpshurCounty era that removal was proper because
"the body in question was ajudicialbody under state law." Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA,
Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1263 (3d Cir 1994) (emphasis added).
194. Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 472 (1890); see also Marc D. Falkoff,
Abrogating State Sovereign Immunity in Legislative Courts, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 853, 879
(2001) (observing that "[iun the past, the [Supreme] Court has adopted a functional standard for
determining whether an action before an agency is to be deemed a suit at law" (emphasis
added)); Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. LaFave, Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial in
Non-Article IIIProceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional ConstitutionalTheory, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 407, 433 n. 136 (1995) (noting that "[i]n UpshurCounty, the [Supreme] Court held
that despite the fact that removal was from a 'county court,' the case did not involve a
removable 'suit"').
195. See supranotes 28-30 (discussing increase to federal dockets following the Judiciary
Act of 1875).
196. Supra note 44 and accompanying text. In its analysis, the Tool & Die Makers court
looked at the procedures of the WERB and found that they revealed its judicial character, but a
proper focus on the judicial power of the WERB under Upshurwould have revealed that the
WERB lacked the power to enforce its own orders, which certainly a "court" vested with
judicial power by a state would have the ability to do.
197. Upshur County, 135 U.S. at 472.
198. For example, in 1959, the WERB and the Wisconsin Public Service Commission
(WPSC) used the same procedures, but the ratemaking performed by the latter agency is a
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Supreme Court, therefore, did not adopt a functional test in its decision;
however, it did state that for an action to be a "suit" at law, the proceeding
needed to be interpartes, and the tribunal needed to be vested with judicial
power by its state. 199
VII. The FunctionalTest: A Reevaluation
In a 1960 law review commentary on the Tool & Die Makers opinion, it
was predicted that with the increasing grants to state administrative agencies of
functions formerly exercised by courts, the federal courts, in deciding whether a
state agency is a "court" for removal purposes, would "attempt to formulate
new and more meaningful standards. 20 0 Unfortunately, the federal courts have
come no closer to developing a meaningful standard than they had in 1960, nor
has the issue yet reached the Supreme Court for clearer guidance.
This Part attempts to reconcile the tension between the respective state and
federal interests at stake in the argument over removal from state agencies. In
examining the tension, it becomes apparent that the functional test has
outgrown any usefulness it might have once had for federal courts struggling to
interpret the phrase "state court." Because of the overwhelming policy
implications for states and plaintiffs, this Part argues for adherence to the plain
language of the phrase "state court," an analytic method which recognizes the
legitimate and valuable role agencies occupy in a state's development of its
regulatory and administrative system. Addressing what constitutes a "court,"
furthermore, should depend on whether a state's constitution has vested judicial
power in the state agency, which respects the states' rights to provide for a
judicial system as they see fit and comports with the Supreme Court's standard
in Upshur County. However, because Section 301(a) claims greatly increase
the federal interests in the subject matter and in the provision of a federal
forum, while simultaneously nearly extinguishing most state interests in
establishing a labor agency, this Part also advocates for an amendment to 29
U.S.C. § 185(a), 20 1 the current federal statute implementing Section 301(a) of
legislative, not judicial, function. A proceeding before the WPSC, therefore, should never
constitute a removable suit regardless of the similarity between its procedures and a court's.
Note, Removal of State Administrative Proceedingsto the FederalCourts, 12 STAN. L. REV.
492, 497 (1960).
199. Upshur County, 135 U.S. at 475,476.
200. Removal to FederalCourtsfrom State Administrative Agencies, supranote 52, at 617.
201. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006) (providing litigants ability to bring labor disputes
involving CBAs in any district court of the United States regardless of citizenship or amount in
controversy).
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the LMRA, which would provide litigants charged in state agencies the ability
to remove actions arising out of or requiring the interpretation of a CBA.
A. "State Court" Requires a PlainLanguageInterpretation
Justice Cardozo once said, "[W]e do not pause to consider whether a
statute differently convened and framed would yield results more consonant
with fairness and reason. We take the statute as we find it."' 20 2 Those courts

adopting the functional test have not heeded Justice Cardozo's maxim, but
instead impermissibly have reached far beyond the plain language of the
removal statute, as the question is not whether Congress should allow for
removal from
state agencies, but rather whether Congress explicitly has
20 3
provided so.

It is axiomatic that statutory interpretation begins with the text of the
statute, and if the language is plain and unambiguous, then the language
controls. 204 Traditionally, an agency is not a court; it is an executive or
legislatively created tribunal that regulates a certain subject matter.2 °5 Because
an agency is not a court vested with judicial power, although it may conduct
court-like adjudications, the plain language of the removal statute is
unambiguous, and therefore controlling. Section 1441(a) should not apply to
state agencies not vested with judicial power. Additionally, courts have pointed
out that when Congress has seen fit to allow removal from tribunals that are not
considered traditional "state courts" it has done so, and when it has chosen not
to grant status to non-federal trial courts, federal courts have held that those
courts are not "state courts. ' 20 6 Thus, because removal jurisdiction is a
202. Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1933).
203. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (noting that the functional test has
been criticized as transforming the removal inquiry).
204. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 527, 535 (1947) ("Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed statute,
one certainly begins there.").
205. See COOPER, supra note 9, at 96 (defining administrative agency to include "all those
governmental organs (other than the legislature or the courts) which possess authority to make
rules affecting private rights or to adjudicate contested cases").
206. See Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777,780 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing inapplicability of
removal to tribal court). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006) (defining "State court" to include
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia), and 48 U.S.C. § 864 (2006) (authorizing
removal of actions commenced in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico), with
Territory of Guam v. Landgraf, 594 F.2d 201, 202 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to read
congressional references in 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) to an action in "state" court as including an
action inthe Territory of Guam because there was no explicit reference in the statute including
the Territory of Guam as a "state court").
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statutory creation, until Congress decides to expand federal removal jurisdiction
to encompass actions filed in state agencies, the federal courts may not exercise
jurisdiction over such actions.
There are also other reasons why a plain language interpretation of the
phrase "state court" is required in the removal context. Adherence to the plain
language of "state court," instead of resorting to the functional test, comports
with the policy and purpose behind Congress's provision of removal
jurisdiction. As noted previously, the right of removal is purely statutory, and
as such, is entirely subject to legislative control. °7 While the interpretation of
the removal statute is a matter of federal, not state, law, the Supreme
Court has
20 8
directed lower courts to construe the grant of removal strictly.
Cited earlier, Justice Stone's opinion in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets20 9 advanced the rule for strict construction of the removal statute.2 10 The
Act of 1887's substantial contraction of removal that was provided by the
Judiciary Act of 1875, coupled with the "policy of the successive acts of
Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts," in his opinion, indicated
a desire by Congress for strict construction. 21 Both the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have reaffirmed Justice Stone's strict construction
philosophy, and some courts have required that all doubts on the propriety of
removal be resolved in favor of remand.2 12
Strict construction of removal, in turn, respects our nation's idea of
federalism. The Supreme Court has long cited to the reserved power of the
~
frt
states, under the Tenth Amendment, 213 to provide
for the determination of
controversies in their courts, which may be restricted only by acts of Congress

207. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) (explaining that the
power of removal "is not to be found in express terms in any part of the constitution; if it be
given, it is only given by implication" and "[tihe time, the process, and the manner, must be
subject to its absolute legislative control"); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3721
(discussing removal's dependence on congressional authority).
208. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (stating that the
removal statute must be construed strictly).
209. See id. (holding that the removal statute did not allow a plaintiff, who was sued by the
original defendant in a counterclaim, to remove the action to federal district court).
210. Id.
211. Id.; see also supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's
restrictions on removal in 1887).
212. See WRIGHTET AL., supra note 3, § 3721 ("Consistent with the philosophy expressed
by Justice Stone, there is ample case support... at all levels of the federal courts... for the
proposition that removal statutes will be strictly construed," and "[s]ome federal courts go
further.., and say that all doubts. .. should be resolved" in favor of remand).
213. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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in conformity with Article III of the Constitution. 2 14 "Due regard for the
rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal
courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the
precise limits which the statute has defined., 215 Furthermore, the federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction, and depriving a state court of an action
properly brought within its jurisdiction, interferes with states' rights to resolve
controversies pursuant to their own determinations, thereby exacerbating the
federalism concerns.2 16 Both statutory and federalism reasons, therefore,
require plain language to control the interpretation of "state court."
Additionally, in the Judicial Code, there are examples of the Supreme
Court interpreting jurisdictional statutes according to their plain language, and
in many of the situations, the stakes are higher for the loser than for defendants
seeking removal of initial state agency proceedings to federal court.21 7 The
Supreme Court previously has been tasked with interpreting the phrase "state
court" in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 21S-the implementing statute of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause2 '-which requires federal courts to give full faith
and credit to the "judicial proceedings of any court of any... State. 220 In
214. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,270 (1934) (explaining basis for strict construction
of removal statute as it pertains to amount-in-controversy requirement of removal based upon
diversity-of-citizenship).
215. Id.
216. MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 107.05.
217. A further illustration of this point is the Supreme Court's refusal to find a Seventh
Amendment defect in the refusal of Congress to permit juries to be seated in non-Article III
courts. See Falkoff, supra note 194, at 879-80 (discussing formalist approach of Supreme
Court in its treatment of the Seventh Amendment in non-Article III courts in support of
contention that non-Article III courts, as creatures of Congress and subject to elected-branch
control should not be answerable to judicially developed doctrines like sovereign immunity).
Professor Falkoff argues that "sovereign immunity is a concept foreign to the administrative
agency context, since legislative courts are more properly understood to be regulatory bodies
rather than courts of law." Id. at 876. Some would argue that haling a state into a legislative
court should make no constitutional difference in invoking the sovereign immunity doctrine, but
Falkoff argues that "there is a clear conceptual difference between legislative and judicial courts,
even if the distinction between them has been a problem of a 'highly theoretical nature' and
'productive of much confusion and controversy."' Id. at 879. For a further discussion of why
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial shouldextend to administrative adjudications of a
"statutorily created cause of action on behalf of or against a private individual or entity," see
Redish & LaFave, supra note 194, at 432-34.
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
219. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (requiring that "[flull Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State").
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (emphasis added). The act provides:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State... shall be
proved or admitted in other courts within the United States ....
Such Acts,
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University of Tennessee v. Elliott,22 1 the Supreme Court stated that § 1738 "is
not applicable to the unreviewed state administrative factfinding" of a state
administrative law judge.222 The Supreme Court similarly found § 1738
inapplicable to a judicially unreviewed decision of an arbitrator in light of the
plain language of the statute, which refers to "judicial proceedings" of state
courts.223 Nearly every lower court to examine the issue has held that § 1738 is
inapplicable to unreviewed state administrative decisions because of the
' 22 4
statute's specific reference to "judicial proceedings" of "state courts."
More recently, the Supreme Court used plain language to interpret the
supplemental jurisdiction statute. 2 2 5 The Court allowed a federal district court
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state claims seeking
deferential review of administrative decisions in federal court, despite the fact
that the district court would not have original jurisdiction over the state
claims.226 The Court applied the statute to the facts of the case in a very
straightforward manner, observing that "[n]othing in § 1367(a) suggests that
district courts are without supplemental jurisdiction over claims seeking [onthe-record review] of local administrative determinations," as the statute
records and judicial proceedings.., shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States ....
Id.(emphasis added).
221. See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99 (1986) (holding that unreviewed
state agency proceedings should be given preclusive effect in federal courts, except for when
Congress, as in the case of Title VII, has provided otherwise); see also BATOR ET AL.,supranote
16, at 1627-28 (discussing effect of res judicata on state court judgments).
222. Univ. of Tenn., 478 U.S. at 794 (emphasis added). The Court, however, also held that
the federal common law rule of preclusion applied when a state agency "acts in a judicial
capacity" and "resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an
opportunity to litigate." Id.at 799. While this holding would appear to lend support to those
courts adopting the functional test, there is no federal common law governing removal; removal
is solely governed by statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (2006) (enumerating the different
ways removal can be accomplished).
223. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 288 (1984).
224. See Robert P. Morris, How Many Bites are Enough? The Supreme Court'sDecision
in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 55 TENN. L. Ruv. 205, 226 n.150 (1988) (citing cases).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). The statute provides:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over allother claims that are so related
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Id. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).
226. See City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165-66 (1997) (holding that
the district court properly exercised federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims and
properly recognized that it could also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state
law claims for deferential review of an agency decision).
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generally provides supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims," not just
claims of which the district courts would have original jurisdiction.227 The
Court specifically noted that Congress could establish an exception to
supplemental jurisdiction for claims seeking deferential review of state agency
decisions, but the plain language of the statute bore no such construction.228
Even though the Supreme Court has applied plain language to interpret
"state court" in the Judicial Code, the courts adopting the functional test still
argue that a plain language reading of the statute forecloses defendant access to
a federal forum. 229 Thus, in effect, those courts have allowed access to a
federal forum-a right only available to litigants that meet every requirement of
the removal statute-to trump every legitimate interest states have in
establishing agencies to regulate through adjudication. As the Volkswagen
court conceded, 230 however, appeals from state agency decisions or petitions to
enforce agency action in a definitive "state court" may be removable to a
court, thereby allowing the defendant access to a federal
federal district
1
forum.

23

Id. at 171.
Id.at 169.
Supra notes 59, 70-74, 101 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
231. See WRIGHT ET A., supra note 3, § 3721 ("[A]n appeal to a state court from an
administrative agency or a de novo judicial proceeding following an administrative
determination may take the form of a civil action and therefore be removable."). The ability to
remove an appeal of a state agency decision to federal district court could be foreclosed by
characterizing the initial agency proceeding as "judicial" under the functional test because
removal of an "appellate" action brought in a state court to a federal court does not come within
the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts. See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 581 (1954) (upholding dismissal, for lack of subject matterjurisdiction, of
an original diversity action seeking review of a state agency's orders in a condemnation
proceeding because lower federal courts do not sit on appellate review of state agency
proceedings). However, if a state provides de novo review of state agency action, then the lower
federal courts have original jurisdiction. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 355
(1961); see also Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 248 F.2d 477,479
(8th Cir. 1957) (upholding removal from state court of an appeal from an order of the Minnesota
State Railroad and Warehouse Commission because proceeding became a "civil action" and
federal court had "original jurisdiction"); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 73, at 664-66
(arguing that employing a functional analysis to classify initial state agency proceedings as
either administrative or "judicial" runs the risk of excluding federal courts after the initial
agency proceeding). Woolhandler and Collins argue this can be avoided by presuming that
judicial review of an initial agency decision is itself the beginning of an original "judicial" phase
and not an "appellate" phase. Id. at 666 n.219. Eventually, whether an appeal from an agency
decision is considered de novo or deferential may not be determinative of whether a federal
district court has "original jurisdiction" over the removal of the appeal, providing even further
support for the argument that defendants will have access to a federal forum upon removal of an
at 661 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in City
agency appeal in a state court. See id.
227.
228.
229.
230.
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Thus, with prior plain language interpretations of "state court" in the
Judicial Code and in the context of the CWA and CAA,232 there is ample
support for the argument that the phrase "state court" is not applicable to state
agency proceedings, even if such agencies exercise quasi-judicial functions.
Although there are plenty of valid and logical reasons why Congress should
allow for removal from state agencies, federal courts must only interpret the
statute Congress has provided.233 Additionally, since 1789, the removal statute
2 34
has required that a civil action be brought originally in a "state court.
Although this antedates the creation of modem state administrative agencies,
Congress has since amended the removal statute several times without changing
the "state court" requirement and has in other statutes equated administrative
agencies to "state courts. 2 35 Until Congress provides otherwise, it is improper
for federal courts to reach beyond the directive of a long-standing congressional
statute.236 The language of the statute should be dispositive, and the language
implies that
the entity in question be a "court," not a state administrative
237
agency.
B. The Policy Consequences ofAllowing Removalfrom State
Agency Proceedings
The overwhelming policy consequences that could result from the
extensive adoption and use of the functional test also support a plain language
interpretation of "state court." First, the functional test has the "capacity to
create substantial mischief in the administrative arena, by encouraging parties

of Chicago v. InternationalCollege of Surgeons "may be a welcome step in recognizing that
federal courts can readily accommodate deferential review and the exercise of original
jurisdiction").
232. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text (discussing the general agreement
among the circuit courts of appeals that "state court" in the CAA and CWA citizen suit
provisions does not apply to state agency adjudications due to the plain language of the

statutes).
233. See Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777, 780 (10th Cir. 1990) ("We must be careful not to
expand the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond Congressional mandates.").
234. Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
235. See supraPart II (discussing creation and amendments of removal statute); supra note
166 (discussing statutes with preclusion provisions that apply to actions diligently prosecuted in
"state courts" or "administrative agencies").
236. Becenti, 902 F.2d at 781.
237. Johnson v. Albertson's LLC, No. 3:08cv236/MCR/MD, 2008 WL 3286988, at * 4
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2008).
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to take a shot at removal, with inevitable delays and disruptions. '' 3 The ability
to remove state agency proceedings also could result in "the unwarranted, and
thus wasteful, expenditure of limited federal judicial resources" as courts
struggle to deal with the inevitable increased petitions for removal that could
result from the widespread use of the functional test. 239 Furthermore, motions
to remand would require detailed factual inquiries into agencies' procedures
and functions, "raising the potential for evidentiary challenges necessitating
discovery and evidentiary hearings," a result not contemplated by the creation
of removal in the Judiciary Act of 1789.240
Widespread adoption and use of the functional test also undervalues
states' interests in establishing agencies and interrupts agency adjudications
that are attempting to fulfill their administrative delegations. Surely, despite the
suggestion of the Volkswagen court, the states' purposes and interests reach
beyond providing litigants with an alternate forum. 24' Agencies, whether
federal or state, are creatures of the executive and legislative branches of
government, with goals of instituting and enforcing substantive regulations.242432
Agency adjudications, which often provide an efficient method of regulating,
were not intended to co-opt the traditional powers of the courts.24 Instead,
states create and use agency adjudications for many legitimate reasons: to
provide a more hospitable forum for interests often disfavored by the courts; to
enable the development of expertise "as a result of extensive experience with
case law, statutes, and technical facts in a particular area"; to enable the

238. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1283
(N.D. Fla. 2002). Mischief and delay were the chief consequences cited by the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals for rejecting removal from state agency proceedings. Supra notes
126-31 and accompanying text.
239. Albertson's LLC, 2008 WL 3286988, at *2.
240. Id.
241. See Katz, supra note 71, at 116 ("Essentially, the [Volkswagen] court analyzed the
question in a way that both overvalued the federal interests involved and undervaluedthose of
the states."). Katz concluded that the Volkswagen court's comparison of the "residual" state
interest and the federal interests is "questionable." Id, at 117.
242. Supra note 205 and accompanying text.
243. See Falkoff, supranote 194, at 872 ("The driving force behind the creation of such
tribunals... is that adjudication is both an efficient and inevitable mode of administrative
regulation.").
244. In the federal context, Congress has long created non-Article I] tribunals that regulate
through adjudicatory processes. Originally, the agency adjudications vindicated "public
rights"-"those which arise between the government and person subject to its authority in
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments"-but eventually, the Supreme Court expanded on the subject matter and allowed
non-Article HI tribunals to resolve disputes between private parties. Id. at 873.
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decision-maker to conduct a comprehensive independent factual investigation,
both to address the private rights of parties before the tribunal and the greater
public interest in the regulation; or to ease delay and costs that are often
associated with bringing claims that usually accompany traditional judicial
proceedings.245 Moreover, because courts are often concerned with the
resolution of rights between private parties and usually are not tasked with
developing broad public policy, agency adjudications
also can be structured to
246
develop state legislative and regulatory policy.
To put all these implications in perspective, one must realize the
importance of removal jurisdiction in the modern judicial state of affairs. In
2006 alone, over 29,000 cases, or approximately 11% of the federal cases
pending in federal court, were removed cases.247 Regardless of whether or not
cases stay in the federal system after removal, the increasingly extensive use of
the functional test would burden an already strained judiciary, as courts
applying the functional test would be required to engage in detailed, factual
analyses into the functions and procedures of particular state agency
adjudications.
Much is at stake for both parties in a struggle over the removal of an
action, but especially for the plaintiff fighting removal to federal court.
Empirical studies have shown that a "removal effect" "results [from] a
precipitous drop in the plaintiffs' win rate."2 48 By removing a case from the
plaintiff-chosen state forum to federal court, the defendant greatly increases her
odds of success. 249 One study, analyzing data from the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts-assembled by the Federal Judicial Center--of
civil cases terminated during fiscal years 1987 to 1994, found that, in diversity
cases, the plaintiff's "win rate drops from 71% in original cases to 34% in
removed cases," a consequence of "major importance" because "removed cases
account[ed] for 17% of the diversity judgments in the data set., 250 In federal
question cases, excluding prisoner litigation, the plaintiff's win-rate dropped
245. See Removal to FederalCourtsfrom State AdministrativeAgencies, supranote 52, at
619-20 (enumerating state purposes and goals in creating agencies).
246. See Removal of State Administrative Proceedingsto the FederalCourts,supra note
198, at 497 (stating that the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act revealed that the legislature
intended the WERB to be a policy-making body even when settling disputes over a CBA).
247. MOORE ETAL., supra note 2, § 107-23.
248. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,83 CORNELLL. REv.
581, 581 (1998) (concluding that, in a regression "controlling for many case variables, [the]
'removal effect' remains sizable and significant").
249. Id. at 593.
250. Id.
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from 52% to 25%.251 The authors of the study concluded that the explanation
for the "removal effect" is that forum matters.252 The entire purpose and effect
of removal jurisdiction is that it defeats the plaintiff's tactical forum choice.253
The plaintiff's forum choice matters the most in removal cases because such
cases are those in which both plaintiff and defendant have tried to forumshop.254
Besides decreasing a plaintiff's win-rate, removal from state agencies
could also result in the plaintiffs total abandonment of her claims when they
are removed to federal court; other complainants, "through ignorance,
inexperience or inadequate resources will delay long enough that their cases
will go by default. 2 55 Complainants also may find that, upon removal to
federal court, the costs of further litigation far outweigh their interests, thereby
negating an advantage that often prompts creation of state agency
adjudication-allowing citizens to take advantage of alternative, lower
maintenance forums. 256 Instead, plaintiffs will find themselves in a federal
court system that increasingly is hostile to their actions.257
Removal to federal courts also deprives plaintiffs of the "informality and
flexibility which are characteristic of administrative proceedings," and in
federal court, they face the burden of proving their case, whereas in an agency
setting, the state's administrative system often investigates and processes
claims.258 Removal from state agencies denies the "complainants the benefits
available to them in the state's forum," and "succeeds in denying the state 25
all9
opportunity to implement its own policies, and to apply its own remedies.
The consequences of the functional test are real; the standard interrupts states'
administrative systems and places plaintiffs in the very forum they sought to
avoid.

251. Id. at 593-95.
252. Id. at 598.
253. Id.
254. Id. According to the authors, removal may "dislodg[e] the plaintiff's lawyer from a
familiar and favored forum, and... [may] revers[e] the various biases, costs and other kinds of
inconveniences, disparities in court quality, and differences in procedural law that led the
plaintiff to prefer state court." Id.
255. Katz, supranote 71,at 119.
256. Id. at 120-21.
257. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, ContractingAccess to the Courts: Myth orReality? Boon or
Bane? 40 ARIz. L. REV. 965,969-95 (1998) (chronicling the modem federal judiciary's efforts
to increase hurdles for plaintiffs' access to adjudication on the merits in federal courts).
258. Katz, supranote 71, at 121-22.
259. Id. at 124.
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C. A New Solution
Although adhering to the plain language of the removal statute comports
with both law and policy, there are two minor problems with the method:
(1) there is no exact definition of "state court" in the removal statute; and
(2) the complete preemption doctrine embodied in Section 301 (a) of the LMRA
eclipses almost all state interests in providing an agency forum to adjudicate
unfair labor practice claims requiring interpretation of CBAs.
1. The Correct Definition of "State Court"
The removal statute defines "State court" to include "the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia" and defines "State" to include "the District of
Columbia. 2 60 Beyond these two definitions, however, Congress provided no
further guidance for courts attempting to apply the plain language of the statute
to administrative agencies, although the implication of Upshur County is that
the name
a state bestows on a tribunal is not dispositive of whether it is a
26
"court."

1

Because the reference to "state court" has existed since the creation of
removal in 1789, one possible analytic method by which to attack the issue
involves examining the state judiciary systems, and specifically, their "courts,"
as they existed in 1789. A general survey of the state judiciary system reveals
that in 1789, state courts were not organized in a hierarchical system-levels
comprising trial courts, intermediate courts, and a supreme court-but instead,
were structured horizontally, with "appeals" simply taken by courts with more
judges than the previous court.262 Corps ofjudges sometimes went singly into
the field to try cases, and at other times, assembled as one body in order to try
cases and consider "appeals. '263 Unlike America's modem judicial system,
there was no clear distinction between trial courts and appellate courts, and
review of a trial court decision often included a new trial, as the courts were
concerned with the correctness of the resolution, not necessarily "making" the

260. 28 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006).
261. See Southaven Kawasaki-Yamaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 975,978
n.3 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (observing that Upshur County held that "notwithstanding a state's
characterization of a body as a 'court,' that body may not, in fact, be a court for removal").
262. See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:
ExPOSING MYTHs, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 5-7 (Wythe Holt & L.H.

LaRue eds., 1990) (providing description of state judiciaries in 1789).
263. Id.at 5-6.
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law. 264 Finally, "the courts of last resort were commonly a branch of the
legislature, or5 a body amalgamating judges, legislators, and members of the
26
executive. ,
With such diversity among the state judiciaries-"[l]egislatures made
frequent changes, adding new features, dropping old ones, and changing those
retained"-the drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789 departed from the
fluctuating state systems, and the new national system outlined in the Act
became the model upon which the state judiciaries eventually were based.266
Because many of the states at least had some form of general trial courts, it may
be reasonable to assume Congress intended for removal to occur from such
state trial courts. 26 7 But with the wide-ranging diversity apparent in the state
judiciary systems at the time, it seems almost impossible to argue forcefully that
there was a clear standard by which to determine the dispositive characteristics
of "state courts."
The most logical way to resolve the issue is for courts, when faced with a
civil action removed from a state agency, to examine the state's constitution
and statutes to determine whether the state has vested "judicial power" in the
administrative agency. Not only does this provide a rule that is dependent upon
actual statutory law-rather than the judicially developed and malleable
functional test-but the analysis would be consistent with the Supreme Court's
holdings in multiple Upshur County-era cases that for a tribunal to be a "court,"
it must be vested with "judicial power" by its state.2 68 The Court, in the
removal context, did not focus on a tribunal's fimctionality with respect to a
specific proceeding to determine the status of the tribunal.269
264. See id. at 27-28 ("The point is that in the eighteenth-century successive trials, even
successive jury trials were common. The final result of these successive trials would be to reach
the one and only 'correct' result .... The eighteenth-century judge 'found' the law; the
twentieth century judge 'makes' the law.").
265. Id. at 6.
266. Id.at 35.
267. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (describing the Judiciary Act of 1789).
268. Supra notes 39, 44-45, 139-40 and accompanying text.
269. See Comm'rs of Road Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 257 U.S.
547, 560-61 (1922) (holding that Arkansas county court was a "court" because the Arkansas
Constitution vested judicial power in the county courts, even though sometimes they also
performed administrative functions); Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F.
Supp. 2d 1280, 1282-83 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (arguing that "[t]he natureof a specific dispute bears
on the question of whether a proceeding is a 'civil action,' but ordinarily does not alter the
status of the tribunal"). Reading § 1441 (a) to allow for removal of "every proceeding of an
adjudicatory nature" without imposing that the tribunal also be a "state court" would render the
statute's reference to "state court" "wholly superfluous." Id.at 1283. But see Prentis v. Atd.
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (concluding that ratemaking proceedings before the
Virginia State Corporation Commission were not proceedings in a "court" because they were
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For example, in Maryland, the judicial power of the state "is vested in a
Court of Appeals, such intermediate courts of appeal as the General Assembly
270
may create by law, Circuit Courts, Orphans' Courts, and a District Court.,
Unlike other states, Maryland has not provided expressly or impliedly for the
creation of other courts by the legislature, and creation of a new "court" would
require an amendment to Maryland's Constitution. 1 On the other hand, the
Texas Constitution vests judicial power "in one Supreme Court, in one Court of
Criminal Appeals, in Courts of Appeals, in District Courts, in County Courts,
in Commissioners Courts, in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in such other
courts as may be provided
by law," but its courts have held that state agencies
27 2
are not "courts."
legislative, not judicial, in nature). The Commission's decision regarding the legality of the
rates should have been res judicata, but the Court ruled that the federal circuit court, on
principles of comity, should not entertain a suit seeking injunctive relief against the
Commission's rates, before an appeal was sought from the rates to the Virginia Supreme Court.
Id. at 229-30. The res judicata and removal contexts are dissimilar enough to distinguish this
case. Courts interpret the removal statute strictly in favor of remand-a legitimate and earnest
reason not to include state agencies in its definition-while courts interpret res judicata more
broadly so as to conserve judicial resources and to increase efficiency.
270. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
271. See Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 343 A.2d 521, 526 (Md. 1975)
(explaining that "[u]nder the Maryland Constitution,. .. the judicial function may be exercised
only by those courts enumerated in the Constitution" and that "[w]ith the exception of the
express authorization to create intermediate courts of appeal, the General Assembly ...is not
empowered to create additional 'courts' to exercise judicial power"). Furthermore, the court
observed that the Maryland Constitution, and not the adjudicatory function which an entity
performs, determines whether or not the entity is performing a judicial function. Id. Maryland
courts have upheld the delegation to state agencies of certain "quasi judicial" functions, but also
have held that the decision of an administrative agency is the result of the discharge of its
executive duties, not the result of the exercise of judicialpower. See Ocean City Bd. of
Supervisors of Elections v. Gisriel, 648 A.2d 1091, 1096 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (describing
delegation of "quasi judicial" power to administrative agencies, but recognizing that because
agencies do not exercise judicial power, review of an agency decision by a court is an exercise
of original jurisdiction).
272. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 1. The Texas Constitution further provides that the
"[1]egislature may establish such other courts as it may deem necessary and prescribe the
jurisdiction and organization thereof, and may conform the jurisdiction of the district and other
inferior courts thereto." Id.In interpreting the Texas Constitution's vesting ofjudicial powers,
one court stated:
An administrative agency is not a "court" and its contested-case proceedings are not
lawsuits, no matter that agency adjudications are sometimes referred to loosely as
being "judicial" in nature. Agency adjudications do not reflect an exercise of the
judicial power assigned to the "courts" of the State in Tex. Const. Ann. art. V,§ 1;
they are simply executive measures taken in the administration of statutory
provisions.
Beyer v. Employees Ret. Sys., 808 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Tex. App. 1991).

1874

66 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1831 (2009)

Other states, however, have not confined "judicial power" only to
traditional "courts." The Alabama Constitution, beyond providing that the
judicial power of the state is vested "exclusively in a unified judicial system
which shall consist of a supreme court, a court of criminal appeals, a court of
civil appeals, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, a
trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the district court,, 27 3 also states that
the legislature "may vest in administrative agencies established by law such
judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the
accomplishment of the purposes of which the agencies are created."2 74 Thus,
Alabama may consider state agencies, vested with judicial power by the
legislature, to be the equivalent of "state courts," and actions filed in those
agencies may be removable to federal district court under the plain language of
the removal statute.
Reliance on the state's provision of"judicial power" is a workable analysis
for determining whether the plain language of "state court" encompasses
agency adjudications. Not only does the analysis adhere to the plain language
of the statute but it also accounts for the federal interests in removal jurisdiction
and respects the states' judicial and regulatory provisions. If the state perceives
it to be wise to vest "judicial power" in a state agency, then it is only fair to the
defendant that removal be permissible from such an agency. If the state does
not wish to vest "judicial power" in a state agency, then the federal courts
should respect that decision, as well as the state's interests in the orderly
development of its regulatory scheme.
2. Amending Section 301(a) of the LMRA
The second problem with adherence to the plain language of the removal
statute concerns the complete preemption doctrine of Section 301(a) of the
LMRA. Under complete preemption, the defendant argues that Congress, by
legislating within a given field, evidenced an intent to "occupy the entire field,"
thus making any attempt to claim a remedy outside the congressional scheme
preempted, "whether or not there is a direct conflict with state law., 275 "To the
extent that Congress has provided for private remedies, those remedies become
the exclusive remedies available to plaintiffs," and if the plaintiff characterizes
her claims as state claims, the complete preemption doctrine recharacterizes

273. ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 139(a).
274. Id. § 139(b).
275. MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 107.14[4][b][iii].
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them as federal claims.2 76 In other words, the plaintiff cannot "artfully plead"
her claims to deprive the defendant of a federal forum.2 77 Section 301 (a) covers
one of the rare substantive areas of law by which Congress has preempted
available state remedies and causes of action.278
The Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting Section 301 (a) spans over a
half-century. 279 The Court repeatedly has reaffirmed the two general
propositions of Lincoln Mills: (1) federal courts have jurisdiction over
controversies involving CBAs; and (2) state and federal courts must apply
federal law fashioned from national labor law policy.28 ° While state and federal
courts retain concurrent jurisdiction in resolving disputes over CBAs,28'
"Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over
inconsistent legal rules. '282 In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, the Supreme
Court held that Section 301 (a) actions brought in state courts could be removed
pursuant to federal question jurisdiction because
claims dependent upon
2 83
Section 301 (a) necessarily arise under federal law.
By the end of the 1980s, the Supreme Court had cemented its complete
preemption doctrine. Section 301(a) completely preempts state law claims and
remedies in two situations: (1) claims founded directly on rights created by
CBAs; and (2) claims founded on state law that require the interpretation of a
CBA. 2 4 While the states are not divested ofjurisdiction as a result of complete
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See id. § 107.14[4] [b] [iv] ("Complete preemption remains the exception rather than
the rule.").
279. The Supreme Court's first major statement on Section 301(a) complete preemption
occurred in Textile Workers Union ofAmerica v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), which
held that courts resolving suits brought under Section 30 1(a) must apply federal substantive
labor law. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
280. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,403 (1988) (explaining
that in Lincoln Mills, "we held that Section 301(a) not only provides federal-court jurisdiction
over controversies involving collective-bargaining agreements, but also 'authorizes federal
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining
agreements"' (quoting Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451
(1957))).
281. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 522 (1962) ("The legislative
history of the enactment nowhere suggests that, contrary to the clear import of the statutory
language, Congress intended in enacting [Section] 301(a) to deprive a party to a collective
bargaining contract of the right to seek redress for its violation in an appropriate state
tribunal.").
282. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
283. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
284. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06 ("[1]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon

1876

66 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1831 (2009)

preemption, claims filed by plaintiffs in state courts falling under either of the
above situations are removable normally to federal court.2 85 But, if a plaintiff
files a claim in a state agency-not vested with judicial power by the state's
constitution-that would be preempted by Section 301(a), then adherence to
the plain language of the statute would deprive
the defendant of a right to
2 86
removal normally available in a "state court."
The conundrum presented by such a situation forced the Tool & Die
Makers, Volkswagen, and Floetercourts to adopt the functional test, although,
at the time, Section 301 (a)'s complete preemption doctrine lacked its current,
stronger form. In order to solve this issue without resorting to the functional
test, which this Note has argued impermissibly reaches beyond the plain
language of the removal statute, Congress must amend Section 301 (a) to allow
for removal of such actions brought originally in a state agency. Comparing the
state interests in establishing agency adjudications and the federal interest in
providing for diversity and federal question removal warrants such a conclusion
in this situation.
Traditionally, courts have argued that Congress intended for diversity
jurisdiction removal to protect out-of-state defendants from the bias of state
court judges.287 When compared to the state interests in establishing agency
adjudications discussed previously, the federal interest is dwarfed, a conclusion
empirically supported by the fact that most federal courts presented with
diversity jurisdiction removal, in applying the functional test, remand the case
back to the state agency. 288 Turning to federal question removal, generally, the
the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law.., is preempted
and federal labor-law principles-necessarily uniform throughout the Nation-must be
employed to resolve the dispute."); see also MOORE ET AL.,supra note 2, § 107.14[4][b][v][A]
(discussing Section 301(a) and the complete preemption doctrine).
285. See MOoREETAL.,supra note 2, § 107.14[4][b][v][A] (observing that "any complaint
that purports to assert a state law claim within the scope of the LMRA cause of action
necessarily arises under federal law," and would be removable from state court under federal
question removal).
286. See WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 3, § 3722.1 ("By recognizing a species of cases that are
always removable, the complete-preemption doctrine has been said to function as an
independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
287. See id. § 3721 ("As seems to be true of the original diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
of the federal courts, the right of removal probably was designed to protect nonresidents from
the local prejudices of state courts.").
288. See, e.g., Civil Rights Div. v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., No. 08-60493-CIV, 2008
WL 2616154, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 15, 2008) ("District courts considering this issue have
largely applied the functional test, but have rarely decided the case should remain in federal
court."); Gottlieb v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579-82 (D. Md. 2005)
(applying functional test to proceeding before MIA and finding that Maryland's substantial
interest in enforcing its insurance licensing and regulatory scheme dwarfed any federal interest
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policy justification offered to support such removal is that federal courts are
better equipped to resolve federal claims. 289 The Tool & Die Makers opinion
appeared to imply that, in the state agency context, removal pursuant to federal
question jurisdiction presented a stronger federal interest than diversity
jurisdiction removal. 290 The presence of a possible federal question, however,
does not mean necessarily that states are stripped of concurrent jurisdiction;
when Congress has desired to eliminate completely the jurisdiction of the
states, it has granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.29'
Perhaps federal question removal instead implies that federal courts are
thought more competent to adjudicate federal claims, but Congress was
nonetheless willing to allow plaintiffs to litigate federal claims in state courts if
they so desired. 292 The possibly less-qualified state court, therefore, would
present no greater harm to the defendant's interest than the possibly-biased
state court, in which case, there should be no greater federal interest in federal
question removal than there is in diversity jurisdiction removal. 93 The state's
interests in facilitating enforcement of its administrative scheme,
comparatively, would still outweigh the federal interest in providing a forum to
a defendant to adjudicate federal claims.294 Preemption in the collective
bargaining context, however, greatly increases the federal interest, while
simultaneously extinguishing most, if not all, of the state's interests in
establishing labor agencies. 9 5

in the provision of a forum).
289. See MooRE ET AL., supra note 2, § 107.03 ("The original purpose of removal in
federal question cases was to ensure that the tribunal better informed on questions offederal law
would adjudicate the matter.").
290. See Removal to FederalCourtsfrom StateAdministrativeAgencies, supranote 52, at
621 (observing that the Tool & Die Makers court "did not intend to focus only on labor law, but
meant to suggest that federal-question cases should be removed more easily than diversity
cases").
291. Id.at 622.
(arguing that federal question removal can be explained as an "indication that
292. See id.
Congress believes federal courts to be somewhat more qualified than state courts but is
nonetheless willing to have federal questions determined by state courts if litigants so desire").
293. See id.(explaining that there would be no greater need for removal from the less
qualified state court than from the possibly biased state court).
294. If it has been determined the state's interests surpass the federal interest in providing
for diversity jurisdiction removal, then the equivalence between the federal interest in diversity
and the federal interest in federal question jurisdiction leads to the conclusion that the state's
interests also would exceed the federal interest in federal question removal.
295. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3722.1 ("[T]he complete-preemption doctrine
overrides such fundamental cornerstones of federal subject matter jurisdiction as the wellpleaded complaint rule and the principle that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint.").
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As discussed earlier, Section 301(a) covers one of the rare substantive
areas of the law Congress has chosen completely to preempt.296 Absent such
complete preemption, the states maintain the power to provide for state law
claims and remedies, one of their most important interests in establishing
agencies.2 97 But when the state is preempted by Section 301(a), any alternative
state actions or remedies-most often those based on unfair labor practice
charges-are ousted in favor of federal law and remedies.29 8 Therefore, most,
if not all, of the reasons that states establish agencies in the CBA context are
eliminated, and the federal interest in providing a forum to the defendant
equipped to adjudicate a Section 301 (a) claim is much stronger comparatively
than in all other removal cases.
With practically no substantive state interest in providing for an agency
adjudication of claims that implicate Section 301(a)'s complete preemption
doctrine, the reasons advanced for adherence to the plain language of the
removal statute fade. A resolution, however, presents itself that accounts for
both the states' interests in facilitating the orderly operation of agency
adjudications absent interference from the threat of functional test removal, and
the substantial federal interests implicated by Section 301(a) claims: Congress
must amend the LMRA to provide an explicit removal clause for actions filed
in state agencies that are adjudged to be preempted by Section 301 (a). Because
the Tool & Die Makers, Volkswagen, and Floeter courts could not petition
Congress for such an amendment themselves, they resorted to adopting the
functional test, and located the UpshurCounty opinion in an attempt to validate
the test.
While it seemed at the time to be the only answer to the issue, and the
three courts carefully limited their specific holdings to the context presented,
later courts, not presiding over adjudications implicating Section 301(a) claims,
applied the test to removal in a number of substantive legal areas, and
29 9
generally, its application never results in the case remaining in federal court.
Therefore, as Congress has done in the past, 300 it must amend Section 301(a) to

296. Supra note 278 and accompanying text.
297. See Kaucky v. Sw. Airlines Co., 109 F.3d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 1997) ("When federal
law creates an exclusive remedy for some wrong, displacing any remedy that the state may have
for it, a suit to redress that wrong necessarily arises under federal law.").
298. See WRIGHIT ET AL., supranote 3, § 3722.1 (explaining that in complete preemption,
Congress has "replaced the state law with federal law and made it clear that the defendant has
the ability to seek adjudication of the federal claim in a federal forum").
299. Supra note 288 and accompanying text.
300. For an example of Congress relaxing removal requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 1453
(2006).
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allow removal of preempted claims brought originally in state agencies,
provided they meet the other requirements for removal. In the continued
absence of such an amendment, however, adherence to the plain language of
"state court" must be embraced by more courts. As outlined previously, such
an interpretation furthers states' and plaintiffs' interests, reduces judicial waste,
embraces strict construction, gives due regard to federalism, and comports with
the Court's interpretation of "state court" in the Judicial Code.
VIII. Conclusion
The invention of the functional test by the Tool & Die Makers,
Volkswagen, and Floetercourts resulted from agencies adjudicating state law
claims involving CBAs, state law claims which are now preempted completely
by federal law. At the time, those courts needed validation for the functional
test, and they thought they found it in the language of UpshurCounty. Upshur
County, however, instead stood for the idea that, although a state may call a
tribunal a "court," it is not a "court" unless the state's constitution has vested
judicial power in it. To resolve the specialized problem presented by the
complete preemption of Section 301(a) claims, Congress must amend the
statute to allow removal of such actions brought originally in state agencies.
Because outside of claims completely preempted by Section 301(a), the federal
interest in providing a federal forum is weaker than the states' interests in the
agency adjudication, the amendment would obviate the continued use of the
functional test. Only in the Section 301(a) context is the federal interest greater
than the state interests.
Removal from state agencies continues to perplex judges, almost fifty
years after the invention of the functional test by the Tool & Die Makers court.
As state agencies continue to increase in number and scope, clashes between
the removal statute and the states' interests in the utilization of agency
adjudications will continue to be problematic for federal judges. Although
courts adopting the functional test often advance logical arguments why
removal to federal courts should be allowed from state agencies, Congress has
yet to provide such an authorization in the statute itself. Federal courts,
therefore, should adhere to the plain language of the term "state court," which,
in accordance with Supreme Court removal cases, would include tribunals
vested with judicial power by state constitutions. From both doctrinal and
policy perspectives, the plain language interpretation advances the interests of
all the parties involved in the dispute over removal from state agencies, and
hopefully, puts this one subtle refinement finally to rest.

